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Labor Redemption in Work Law 
Andrew Elmore* 
People with criminal records must find and keep work to reintegrate into society. But 
private employers often categorically exclude candidates with criminal record histories, 
especially if the candidate is African American or Latinx. The conventional wisdom is that 
workplace laws offer little to address this problem. People with criminal records are not a 
protected class under Title VII, and many employers fear that hiring people with criminal 
records invites negligent hiring liability. Ban the Box privacy laws delay but may not deter 
overbroad criminal background checks.  
This Article challenges this standard account by shifting focus to the state in imposing 
arbitrary barriers to work. I expose a dignity interest in the removal of these unnecessary 
barriers, or “labor redemption.” I find foundations of labor redemption in successful 
constitutional challenges to denials of public employment and occupational licenses. Labor 
redemption is also, increasingly, a statutory right, in the automated sealing and expungement 
of old and minor criminal records, and issuance of state certifications of individuals  
as rehabilitated. 
Reconceiving of these criminal justice reforms as work law protections can resolve 
structural limitations to Title VII and Ban the Box laws by providing evidence of 
rehabilitation, and permit courts to balance the redemption and security interests in negligent 
hiring claims. Labor redemption also offers a law reform approach to facilitate reintegration 
through work without imposing new legal obligations on private employers, or requiring an 
extension of existing employment laws. This Article’s assessment offers lessons for other areas 
in which private decision makers exclude candidates because of state-imposed stigmas, 
especially the close analogy of housing discrimination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, and the 
highest number and proportion of people with criminal records. There are over 100 
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million arrest records,1 nearly twenty million people in the United States with a 
felony conviction, and an untold, but much larger number of people with 
misdemeanor convictions.2 Intensive, disparate policing and prosecution of African 
American communities have racially skewed the proliferation of criminal records. 
One-third of Black men have a felony conviction, and the United States incarcerates 
Black women at a far higher rate than women of other races.3  
The successful reintegration of individuals into society after incarceration 
requires people to find work after release. But work is elusive for people with a 
criminal record. Even a nonviolent criminal record reduces the chances of an 
employer interview or offer by about fifty percent.4 Two-thirds of people are jobless 
a year after release from incarceration.5  
The conventional wisdom is that workplace laws have failed to keep pace with 
the challenges of integrating people with criminal records in the workforce. This is 
for good reason: there is no federal right to be free from discrimination because of 
a criminal record.6 Claims that criminal record checks violate Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 19647 suffer a number of structural limitations, the most important 
of which is that the employer can often show that such checks are justified by 
business necessity.8 State and local “Ban the Box” laws, which prohibit criminal 
record inquiries until the interview stage, delay but do not prohibit the exclusion of 
people with criminal records from the workforce. Private employers may 
legitimately fear that expanding opportunities for people with criminal records may 
invite negligent hiring liability. Even worse, employers may react to these 
protections by refusing to hire African Americans based on a stereotype that equates 
race and criminality. These structural limitations and perverse incentives seem to 
 
1. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2014, at 2 (2015), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bjs/grants/249799.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GUK9-U6EG]. 
2. ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, PUNISHMENT WITHOUT CRIME 41 (2018); see infra Section I.A 
and note 20. 
3. See BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 251148, PROBATION AND PAROLE 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016, at 23 (2018) [hereinafter PROBATION AND PAROLE ], https://
www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ppus16.pdf [https://perma.cc/92DX-E8CZ]. 
4. See infra Section I.B. 
5. See infra Section I.A. 
6. See Dallan F. Flake, When Any Sentence Is a Life Sentence: Employment Discrimination Against 
Ex-Offenders, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 45, 47 (2015). 
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
has determined that criminal background checks have a disparate impact on African Americans and 
Latinxs and violate Title VII unless consistent with business necessity. U.S. EQUAL  
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE ON THE CONSIDERATION 
OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS UNDER TITLE VII OF THE 
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012) [hereinafter EEOC GUIDANCE ]. 
8. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 248 (3d Cir. 2007); Tammy R. Pettinato, 
Employment Discrimination Against Ex-Offenders: The Promise and Limits of Title VII Disparate Impact 
Theory, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 831, 842–64 (2014); Tammy R. Pettinato, Defying “Common Sense?”: The 
Legitimacy of Applying Title VII to Employer Criminal Records Policies, 14 NEV. L.J. 770 (2014). 
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compel the conclusion that work law plays a marginal—or even 
counterproductive—role in promoting reintegration. 
The contribution of this Article is to show that people after incarceration have 
a dignitary interest in freedom from arbitrary barriers to work that prevent 
reintegration into society, or “labor redemption.”9 This Article argues that, contrary 
to the conventional view, labor redemption is immanent in constitutional, statutory, 
and common law governing the workplace. Labor redemption is a recognized 
dignitary interest in constitutional challenges to re-incarceration for failure to find 
work, and overbroad exclusions from occupational licenses and public 
employment.10 The scholarship has largely ignored the vast array of policy tools 
enacted since the 2007 Second Chance Act,11 which now entitle many people with 
criminal records to the sealing and expungement of old and minor criminal records, 
and certificates of relief to individuals whose criminal record history does not 
suggest future risk. Longstanding federal and state policies encourage hiring through 
tax credits, bonding and insurance. These second-chance reforms resolve structural 
limitations to Title VII and Ban the Box laws by disrupting the stigma of criminal 
records with evidence of rehabilitation and by shifting the costs of reintegration 
away from employers, consumers, and co-workers. They also add nuance to 
negligent hiring claims, permitting courts to balance labor redemption interests 
against the consumer interest in public safety.12 
This Article, finally, offers labor redemption to guide work law reform in 
prioritizing removal of state-imposed stigmas that unnecessarily interfere with 
 
9. See infra Section II.A. Redemption is a criminology term, coined by Alfred Blumstein and 
Kiminori Nakamura, leading scholars on desistance, who use the term to refer to the period after which 
a person with a criminal conviction has no more risk of reoffending than the general public. See Alfred 
Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, Extension of Current Estimates of Redemption Times: Robustness 
Testing, Out-of-State Arrests, and Racial Differences 8 (Oct. 2012) (unpublished manuscript), https:/
/www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240100.pdf [https://perma.cc/4W3T-33J5 ]. “Redemption” 
can be interpreted as a religious term, see J.J. Prescott & Sonja B. Starr, Expungement of Criminal 
Convictions: An Empirical Study, 133 HARV. L. REV. 2460, 2555 n.238 (2020), but I do not mean 
redemption in this sense. I use the term redemption to mean a dignity interest in reintegration after 
incarceration as a full member of the community. This Article’s concept of labor redemption is 
informed by the criminology scholarship of John Braithwaite, the reentry scholarship of Michael Pinard, 
and the moral philosophy of Jeremy Waldron. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND 
REINTEGRATION 55 (1988) (cautioning that state-imposed stigmas can be criminogenic unless 
eventually retired); Michael Pinard, Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of 
Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 457 (2010) [hereinafter Pinard, Collateral Consequences ] (proposing 
a dignity-based approach to reentry); Jeremy Waldron, Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities, 43  
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1107, 1119–20 (2011) (theorizing that individuals have a dignity interest in fulfilling 
important state-assigned responsibilities without unnecessary interference by the state or third parties). 
10. See infra Section III.A. 
11. This assessment is aligned with calls to consider the state role in workplace protections. See 
Samuel Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2004) (arguing that the most 
important barriers preventing the work of people with disabilities are work disincentives in social 
welfare and insurance policies); Gillian Lester, A Defense of Paid Family Leave, 28 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 
1, 9, 12–13 (2005) (assessing that state-funded family leave can be more effective than  
employer-required leave mandates). 
12. See infra Section III.B–C. 
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work.13 Expanding sealing and expungement, and other markers of rehabilitation, 
will reduce employer aversions, permit Title VII plaintiffs to produce evidence of 
rehabilitation, encourage a deliberative interview process in Ban the Box 
jurisdictions, and establish a presumption of rehabilitation in negligent hiring claims. 
While work is at the core of scholarship about reintegration into society after 
incarceration,14 this Article is the first to connect labor redemption to plausible 
litigation challenges to, and second-chance law reform measures limiting, arbitrary 
state-imposed barriers and overbroad criminal background checks.15 The Article 
also contributes to employment law scholarship by demonstrating how  
second-chance reforms have reshaped employment law protections without 
imposing legal obligations on private employers or requiring an extension of 
employment laws. Redemption as a conceptual framework has important 
implications beyond work law, especially for housing discrimination,16 and for other 
civil disabilities that may suggest future risk to employers, including credit history 
problems, past unemployment history or eviction, or receipt of public assistance. 
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins with the staggering costs of 
mass incarceration and its reach into the lives of individuals, who are 
disproportionately African American and Latinx, and who must find work, either 
as an express term of supervised release or in order to reintegrate into society. It 
will then illuminate the ways that state-imposed stigmas impose arbitrary, impassible 
barriers to work. Part II will introduce reintegration through work, or “labor 
redemption,” as a dignity interest, and will show how second chance initiatives 
provide legal entitlement to and incentives for labor redemption. Part III will 
demonstrate how existing employment laws protect labor redemption, particularly 
after second-chance reforms. Labor redemption permits a due process challenge to 
re-incarceration for failure to find work, and state denials of public employment 
and occupational licenses. Even better, second-chance reforms are a conceptual tool 
to resolve structural limitations in Title VII and Ban the Box laws, and enable courts 
to balance competing redemption and security interests in negligent hiring claims. 
Part IV offers labor redemption to guide future law reform. It argues, specifically, 
 
13. See infra Section IV. 
14. See Joy Radice, The Reintegrative State, 66 EMORY L.J. 1315, 1349–50 (2017). The 
scholarship primarily discusses redemption in the context of clemency. See Rachel E. Barkow & Mark 
Osler, Restructuring Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 
3 (2015); ANTHONY C. THOMPSON, RELEASING PRISONERS, REDEEMING COMMUNITIES: REENTRY, 
RACE, AND POLITICS (2008). Benjamin Levin examines the impact of private employers in becoming 
“critical players in the contemporary criminal system,” both as source of exclusion and support. 
Benjamin Levin, Criminal Employment Law, 39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2265, 2268 (2018). 
15. Michael Pinard has previously critiqued the impact of a conviction on dignity interests and 
argued in favor of expanding expungement and sealing measures to protect them. See Michael Pinard, 
Criminal Records, Race and Redemption, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 963, 989–96 (2013); Pinard, 
Collateral Consequences, supra note 9. This Article expands on these themes by identifying constitutional, 
statutory, and tort doctrines that recognize a dignitary interest in redemption and by showing how 
second-chance reforms strengthen them. 
16. See infra Section IV.C. 
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that easing the availability of sealing and expungement and other markers of 
rehabilitation is a more plausible and effective pathway to facilitate successful 
reintegration through work than amending existing work law. Through an 
examination of the close analogy of housing discrimination, it demonstrates how its 
call to turn to the state role in imposing arbitrary barriers has implications beyond 
work law. The Article concludes that labor redemption offers a partial solution to 
the barriers that prevent successful reintegration through work, without expanding 
private employer legal obligations or requiring new employment laws. 
I. LABOR REDEMPTION AS PRECONDITION FOR REINTEGRATION 
Most individuals must work to successfully reintegrate into society after 
incarceration. After release from incarceration, the state requires individuals to 
acquire and maintain work as a term of post-incarceration supervision, and to pay 
court-ordered fines and penalties, under threat of re-incarceration.17 Behind these 
formal state mandates for work lies a broad assignment of the responsibility to find 
work as a central goal of reintegration into society. Reintegration requires the 
individual to find secure housing and health care, reconnect with family, and 
develop positive social networks, all of which can be contingent on a steady, 
meaningful job. 
After briefly describing the centrality of work for reintegration, this Part will 
explore how state-imposed stigmas and barriers to work, especially the creation of 
a permanent, publicly accessible criminal record and occupational restrictions, can 
undermine reintegration.  
A. The Centrality of Work for Reintegration 
There is a well-developed body of scholarship about mass incarceration, 
especially its growth and impact on African Americans and the poor.18 The shadow 
of the carceral state extends well beyond the 2.2 million incarcerated people in the 
United States19 to include the additional 4.5 million adults on parole and probation20 
and the 19 million people, or eight percent of the adult population, in the United 
 
17. Noah D. Zatz, Get to Work or Go to Jail: State Violence and the Racialized Production of 
Precarious Work, 45 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 304, 317–19 (2020). 
18. See, e.g., JAMES FORMAN JR., LOCKING UP OUR OWN: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BLACK 
AMERICA (2017); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); RUTH WILSON GILMORE, GOLDEN GULAG: PRISONS, SURPLUS, 
CRISIS, AND OPPOSITION IN GLOBALIZING CALIFORNIA (2007); DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, 
CRIME, AND FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION (2007); BRUCE WESTERN, 
PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006). 
19. See John Gramlich, America’s Incarceration Rate Is at a Two-Decade Low, PEW  
RSCH. CTR. (May 2, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/05/02/americas-
incarceration-rate-is-at-a-two-decade-low/ [https://perma.cc/Z89V-P4EN]. This includes “1.5 
million under the jurisdiction of federal and state prisons and roughly 741,000 in the custody of locally 
run jails.” Id. 
20. See PROBATION AND PAROLE, supra note 3, at 1.  
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States today with a felony conviction.21 Even this fails to capture the 100 million 
people with arrest records and the explosion of misdemeanor prosecutions, 
estimated to be between 10 and 13 million per year.22  
The criminal justice system is steeped in racial bias against and stigmatization 
of African Americans, from racial bias in police stops and arrests,23 to racially 
disproportionate prosecutions and sentencing of African Americans.24 As a result, 
“approximately one-third of the African American adult male population” has a 
felony conviction.25 
Nearly all incarcerated individuals are eventually released,26 just as most 
individuals placed on probation and parole successfully complete their 
supervision.27 The successful reintegration of these released individuals into society 
is a high priority for the United States. In 2004, George W. Bush declared in his 
State of the Union Address that “America is the land of the second chance, and 
when the gates of the prison open, the path ahead should lead to a better life.”28 In 
2007, the United States enacted the Second Chance Act,29 authorizing grants to 
support comprehensive reentry programming. Barack Obama in 2011 established 
the Federal Interagency Reentry Council, coordinating twenty federal agencies to 
 
21. Sarah K. S. Shannon, Christopher Uggen, Jason Schnittker, Melissa Thompson, Sara 
Wakefield & Michael Massoglia, The Growth, Scope, and Spacial Distribution of People with Felony Records 
in the United States , 1948–2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1806, 1814 (2017). 
22. Alexandra Natapoff estimates that there are thirteen million misdemeanor case filings per 
year. NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 41. 
23. See id. at 10 (summarizing studies showing that, e.g., “Chicago police arrest African 
Americans for marijuana possession seven times more often than they arrest whites, even though whites 
and Blacks use marijuana at the same rates”); Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 558–59 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (describing evidence that stop-and-frisk practices in New York City stopped African 
Americans over five times as often as whites, despite the fact that police found weapons and contraband 
in a greater proportion of stopped whites). 
24. African American men are six times more likely to be incarcerated than white males. 
BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., NCJ 239808, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 8 tbl.8 (2012). One 
in three African American men in their twenties are “either in prison or jail, on probation, or on parole.” 
Dorothy E. Roberts, The Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 
56 STAN. L. REV. 1271, 1274 (2004). In many cities, including Washington, D.C. and Baltimore, more 
than half of young African American men are under criminal supervision. Id. Black women are 
incarcerated at twice the rate of Latinas and over three times the rate of white women. Id.  
25. Shannon et al., supra note 21, at 12. 
26. See Reentry Trends in the U.S., BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., https://www.bjs.gov/content/
reentry/reentry.cfm [https://perma.cc/8FQU-6NKX] (Nov. 2, 2020). 
27. About fifteen percent of individuals on parole and probation are incarcerated per year. 
SUSAN K. URAHN & MICHAEL THOMPSON, THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., PROBATION AND PAROLE 
SYSTEMS MARKED BY HIGH STAKES, MISSED OPPORTUNITIES 1–2 (2018) (“Each year almost 350,000 
of those [2.3 million] individuals [who exit probation or parole] return to jail or prison, often because 
of rule violations rather than new crimes.”). 
28. Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/archive/
fbci/progmenu_reentry.html [https://perma.cc/FAH5-M6ZL] ( last visited Sept. 23, 2020). 
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 10631–10632. 
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improve reentry outcomes,30 and Donald Trump in 2018 reauthorized both the 
Second Chance Act and reconvened the Reentry Council.31 
The United States primarily addresses the reintegration of individuals after 
incarceration into society by affording them with conditional benefits while 
subjecting them to punitive restrictions.32 Reducing recidivism through work is a 
central goal of reentry policy. The U.S. Department of Justice reports that of the 
650,000 people annually released from prison, “two-thirds will likely be rearrested 
within three years of release.”33 Criminologists have found that stable, meaningful 
work is a powerful predictor of desistance,34 and for over a decade, the United States 
has adopted an official position in favor of employment after incarceration to 
encourage rehabilitation.35  
Meaningful, steady work can also improve the emotional and material welfare 
of individuals after release. One longitudinal study of individuals in their first year 
after release from prison reports that “regular skilled work [is] a source of structure 
and pride, capable of repudiating the stigma of incarceration and making one’s 
livelihood a positive source of identity, not just the basis of material well-being.”36 
Even a low-wage job can provide previously incarcerated individuals with material 
and emotional stability, health insurance, a productive routine, and a social role 
associated with maturation and desistance.37  
But reentry work requirements are intended to do more than improve the 
welfare of people after incarceration. They are also a debt to fulfill, backed by the 
threat of reincarceration for failure to work.38 As Noah Zatz, Tia Koonse, Theresa 
 
30. Federal Interagency Reentry Council, NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR., http://
csgjusticecenter.org/nrrc/projects/firc/ [https://perma.cc/4XHN-2FXM] ( last visited  
Sept. 23, 2020). 
31. President Trump Signs First Step Act into Law, Reauthorizing Second Chance Act, COUNCIL 
OF ST. GOV’TS JUSTICE CTR. (Dec. 21, 2018), https://csgjusticecenter.org/jc/president-trump-signs-
first-step-act-into-law-reauthorizing-second-chance-act/ [https://perma.cc/N7EY-JG4A]. 
32. Reuben Jonathan Miller & Forrest Stuart, Carceral Citizenship: Race, Rights and 
Responsibility in the Age of Mass Supervision, 21 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 532 (2017). State reentry 
programs often condition benefits, including subsidized housing, job assistance, and drug treatment 
programs, on payment of fees and fines and compliance with various restrictions, including work 
requirements. Id. at 541–43. 
33. Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, supra note 28. 
34. ALFRED BLUMSTEIN & KIMINORI NAKAMURA, REDEMPTION FOR REINTEGRATING 
PRISONERS IN THE ERA OF WIDESPREAD BACKGROUND CHECKS 10 (2014).  
35. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “[a]ssisting ex-prisoners in finding and 
keeping employment,” is a “key element[ ] . . . of successful re-entry into our community.” Prisoners and 
Prisoner Re-Entry, supra note 28, at 1. 
36. BRUCE WESTERN, HOMEWARD: LIFE IN THE YEAR AFTER PRISON 84 (2018). 
37. Id. at 87–90. 
38. According to Susila Gurusami’s ethnography of work required of formerly incarcerated 
Black women, “the state demands [B]lack women exchange their carceral histories for redemptive 
employment to demonstrate their commitment to criminal rehabilitation.” Susila Gurusami, Working 
for Redemption: Formerly Incarcerated Black Women and Punishment in the Labor Market, 31 GENDER 
& SOC’Y 433, 450 (2017). Rehabilitation work is “payment for their carceral histories beyond the time 
their prison sentences end, specifically through their employment.” Id. 
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Zhen, Lucero Herrera, Han Lu, Steven Shafer, and Blake Valenta explain, the nearly 
five million people released on parole and probation must pursue and maintain 
employment, and may be incarcerated “for refusing certain kinds of work, for 
quitting, and even for being fired.”39 Work is also necessary for people on probation 
and parole to pay state-ordered debt. The United States incarcerates hundreds of 
thousands of people on probation and parole per year for failing to repay on time.40 
The logic of carceral citizenship, then, requires sufficiently remunerative work as a 
continuing expression of rehabilitation in order for the individual to  
receive redemption. 
B. Barriers to Labor Redemption Undermine Reintegration 
The state requirement that individuals after release find work often ignores 
the individuals’ limited employment prospects, the employer’s aversion to hiring 
people with criminal records, and the state’s role in foreclosing meaningful 
employment opportunities. People with criminal record histories have poor 
employment outcomes41 for many reasons, beginning with a bleak labor market at 
the bottom of the income scale.42 Most incarcerated individuals lack a high school 
degree, and many struggle with drug addiction, physical disabilities, and mental 
illness.43 Many individuals with criminal records lack sufficient education to qualify 
for meaningful, stable jobs.44 The disproportionate number of people who have 
been previously incarcerated and who are African American and Latinx must also 
contend with race discrimination by employers.45 
 
39. NOAH ZATZ, TIA KOONSE, THERESA ZHEN, LUCERO HERRERA, HAN LU, STEVEN 
SHAFER & BLAKE VALENTA, GET TO WORK OR GO TO JAIL: WORKPLACE RIGHTS UNDER THREAT 
5 (2016) (reporting that every day “about 9,000 people are incarcerated for violating a probation or 
parole requirement to hold a job”). 
40. Two-thirds of people incarcerated for failure to pay state fines and fees “reported full-time 
work in the month before incarceration—but mostly with earnings below $1,000 per month.” Id. 
Professor Gurusami similarly found that the state mandate for “full-time work with health benefits” 
can lead parole and probation officers to threaten supervised individuals with reincarceration for taking 
“temporary, contract-based, or otherwise . . . insecure or precarious work.” Gurusami, supra note 38,  
at 443. 
41. Most people leaving jail or prison have no job, and sixty to seventy percent of formerly 
incarcerated people are unemployed a year after their release. See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS 
COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER REENTRY (2003). Professor Western, controlling for other 
factors, found that “[m]en with prison records are estimated to earn 30 to 40 percent less each year.” 
WESTERN, supra note 18, at 120. 
42. LAWRENCE MISHEL, JARED BERNSTEIN & HEIDI SHIERHOLZ, THE STATE OF WORKING 
AMERICA 2008/2009, at 16–22, 76–94 (2012). 
43. WESTERN, supra note 36, at 83. 
44. Most people who have been incarcerated lack a high school degree, “score low on cognitive 
tests,” and return to neighborhoods with little opportunity for less-skilled individuals. WESTERN, supra 
note 18, at 110. 
45. See PAGER, supra note 18, at 86–99. Professor Western found that those individuals who 
found steady, well-paying work were primarily white, older men with connections to unions in the 
skilled trades. African American men fared among the most poorly in the study, despite their relative 
youth and good health. WESTERN, supra note 36, at 90–94, 98–99. According to Professor Gurusami, 
her study showed the interplay of class, gender, and race in the reentry goals of parole and probation 
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But, separate from these barriers, the carceral state uniquely restricts 
employment opportunities, both indirectly and directly. Incarceration erodes social 
networks often necessary for referral and hiring, and requires behavioral adaptations 
ill-suited for work.46 As a result, while people previously incarcerated can find 
precarious work in the cash economy, “they are short on the trust, skills, and social 
contacts that open doors to primary sector jobs.”47  
The carceral state also imposes collateral consequences that sharply restrict 
employment opportunity.48 The government imposes myriad collateral 
consequences on individuals with criminal records, including “over 48,000 laws, 
regulations and administrative penalties that constrain the mobility of people with 
criminal records.”49 About three-fourths of collateral consequences are employment 
related,50 and many of these restrict occupational licenses and disqualify private 
sector employers from hiring people who have a criminal record.51 Most of these 
restrictions apply notwithstanding the severity of the conviction or how long ago  
it occurred.52 
The state also directly restricts employment opportunity by creating and 
disseminating publicly accessible records that employers assume is a signal of the 
individual’s future risk. Criminal record histories are examples of what Devah Pager 
has called negative credentials, or “official markers that restrict access and 
opportunity rather than enabling them.”53 Criminal records trigger “social stigma 
and generalized assumptions of untrustworthiness or undesirability.”54 Applicants 
with a marker of risk are often greeted with distrust, rooted in a fear that these 
 
officers and nonprofit caseworkers, who channeled poor, Black women away from jobs they deemed 
dangerous or immoral, and those requiring additional education, and into the female-dominated field 
of social services. Gurusami, supra note 38, at 443–51. 
46. WESTERN, supra note 36, at 113, 122–23. 
47. Id. at 122. 
48. As Michael Pinard explains, “the United States has a uniquely extensive and debilitating web 
of collateral consequences that continue to punish and stigmatize individuals with criminal records long 
after the completion of their sentences. These consequences stifle reintegration by making it difficult, 
if not impossible, for individuals to move past their criminal records and for families to reunite and 
thrive.” Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 524. 
49. Miller & Stuart, supra note 32, at 534. This includes ineligibility for welfare and public 
housing and disqualification from voting, juries, and many types of private- and public-sector 
employment. For a description of these collateral consequences, see JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL 
CRIMINAL RECORD 246–69 (2015). 
50. Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Extending “Dignity Takings”: Re-Conceptualizing the Damage Caused 
by Criminal History and Ex-Offender Status, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 863, 882 (2018) (including 
employment, business license, government contracting, occupational and professional license, and 
certification restrictions). 
51. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 262–63. 
52. Relatively few people who have been incarcerated have been convicted of homicide or rape. 
NATAPOFF, supra note 2, at 40 (“Homicide and rape—the most serious state crimes—comprise less 
than 4 percent of felonies.”). 
53. PAGER, supra note 18, at 32. 
54. Id. at 33. 
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candidates will harm others in the workplace.55 Criminal records can also trigger 
“confirmation bias” in conjunction with race, confirming negative stereotypes that 
associate African American men with risk.56  
Employers almost always consider an applicant’s criminal record before 
making a hiring decision.57 The ubiquity of background checks are driven by the 
digital, public availability of criminal records. Federal, state, and local agencies 
collect criminal records and provide them to private credit reporting agencies, which 
integrate them into digital hiring processes for employers.58  
The integration of big data in hiring has accelerated this trend and made it 
difficult to circumvent.59 Gaps in resumes often cannot be easily explained, and 
with the rise of algorithmic hiring, data mining permits employers to use proxies for 
hidden variables, such as criminal records, when they are difficult to find.60 
A criminal record is a powerful stigma for employers. Most employers report 
that they would not hire an applicant with a criminal record.61 Many field 
experiments conclude that employers are far less likely to offer an interview or job 
to a person who discloses a criminal record, especially if the applicant is Black.62 
Employers have an inflated sense of the risk of a candidate with a criminal record 
 
55. While people with recent criminal record histories are at a higher risk of offending than 
people with no criminal record history, the risk differential diminishes rapidly over time. Megan  
C. Kurlycheck, Robert Brame & Shawn D. Bushway, Scarlet Letters and Recidivism: Does an Old 
Criminal Record Predict Future Offending?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 583, 498–500 (2006). 
56. PAGER, supra note 18, at 71. 
57. One report found that ninety-six percent of surveyed employers indicate that they use one 
or more type of employment background screening. HR.COM, VIEW OF HUMAN RESOURCES 
PROFESSIONALS ON BACKGROUND SCREENING METHODS AND EFFECTIVENESS (2017), http://
www.napbs.com/NAPBS/assets/File/NAPBS_Survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y8E2-83NH]. 
58. See JACOBS, supra note 49, at 32–90. 
59. Id. at 88–90.  
60. See Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 
874–83 (2017). 
61. See Naomi F. Sugie, Noah D. Zatz & Dallas Augustine, Employer Aversion to Criminal 
Records: An Experimental Study of Mechanisms, 58 CRIMINOLOGY 5, 5 (2019); Harry J. Holzer, Steven 
Raphael & Michael A. Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring 
Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 453 (2006) (finding that over sixty percent of employers 
express an aversion to hiring people with criminal records). 
62.  The most comprehensive of these experiments, by Devah Pager, found that the disclosure 
of a criminal record reduces the likelihood of an employer callback by one-half to two-thirds. She 
additionally found that Black testers who disclose a criminal record are far less likely to be considered 
than comparable white testers reporting the same criminal record. PAGER, supra note 18, at 71; see also 
Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial Discrimination: A Field 
Experiment, 133 Q.J. ECON. 191 (2018) (finding that when employers asked about criminal history, 
those reporting no history received nearly two-thirds more callbacks than applicants who reported a 
criminal record); Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, The Effect of Criminal Records on Access to Employment, 
107 AM. ECON. REV. 560, 560–64 (2017) (finding that “employers were 60 percent more likely to call 
back applicants” that do not have a felony conviction); Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Andersen, The 
Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An Experimental Study, 
35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 11, 19 (2016) (reporting that fewer than ten percent of applicants 
reporting a minor criminal record, but nearly thirty percent of applicants reporting no criminal record, 
received an offer or interview appointment). 
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compared with other signals of undesirable behavior. The aversion appears, instead, 
to be status linked, a cognitive bias that channels people with criminal records, 
especially racial minorities, into “bad” jobs associated with low social status 
regardless of qualifications or actual risk.63  
Criminologists have expressed alarm that the growing and permanent stigma 
of a criminal record has disrupted the “traditional models of shaming, reintegration, 
and desistance from crime.”64 Restorative justice proponents argue that  
state-imposed stigmas must be eased over time to avoid “the criminogenic 
consequences of assignment to a deviant master status,” in which people with a 
criminal record are marked as outcasts who are beyond redemption.65 For many 
criminologists, “stigma erosion” is essential for individuals to “transition away from 
social identities and roles as deviants into upstanding citizens,” through meaningful, 
well-paid work.66 Simone Ispa-Landa and Charles Loeffler, summarizing their study 
of individuals after release, cast doubt on whether this transition is possible because 
the ongoing stigma of a criminal record makes “a stable job in the formal economy 
. . . a desirable but elusive goal.”67 Extending labeling theory to the digital footprint 
of a criminal record, Sarah Lageson and Shadd Maruna theorize that the Internet 
has become a “digital prison” for people with a criminal record, which “could 
artificially extend criminal involvements by leading the person to a sense of 
hopelessness or defiance (the so-called self-fulfilling prophecy).”68 Whether or not 
a permanent, publicly available criminal record becomes a self-fulfilling prophesy 
as labeling theory suggests,69 there is little doubt that it is criminogenic, in disrupting 
the role of meaningful work in fostering desistance.70 
 
63. Sugie et al., supra note 61, at 19–20, 24. 
64. Sarah Lageson & Shadd Maruna, Digital Degradation: Stigma Management in the Internet 
Age, 20 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 113, 115 (2018). 
65. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 54–55. 
66. Simone Ispa-Landa & Charles E. Loeffler, Indefinite Punishment and the Criminal  
Record: Stigma Reports Among Expungement-Seekers in Illinois, 54 CRIMINOLOGY 387, 388–89 (2016). 
67. Id. at 399. While interview subjects all expressed a desire for jobs that offered regular hours 
and benefits, many reported that when they sought formal employment, they failed employer 
background checks, even when the charge was dismissed or if the previous conviction was over a decade 
old. Id. at 398–401. 
68. Lageson & Maruna, supra note 64, at 126 (explaining that labeling theory predicts that 
mugshots, arrest records, and criminal dispositions, after being widely shared, searched, and linked to 
other biographical information on the internet, can become a “sticky,” criminogenic label). 
69. Whether a criminal sanction deters or causes crime has been the subject of scholarly debate 
since the 1970s. See Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2521 & n.251. Some labeling theorists have 
proposed that the stigma of labeling people as criminals is self-fulfilling, causing internalization of a 
criminal identity as a way of life. Professor Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming, while accepting 
that stigmatizing forms of shaming can be criminogenic, argues that shaming can deter criminal conduct 
and promote reintegration if it is applied while maintaining bonds of respect, directed at the conduct 
and in the context of societal approval of the person, and terminated with forgiveness. BRAITHWAITE, 
supra note 9, at 100–01. 
70. As Professors Prescott and Starr explain, “[t]o the extent that criminal records limit access 
to quality housing, student loans, satisfying employment, and decent wages, [removing the stigma of 
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II. DIGNITY, REDEMPTION, AND WORK 
The previous Part reconceptualized work as a responsibility assigned by the 
state to individuals with criminal records to reintegrate into society. It also identified 
the state as a source of barriers to work that sharply limit employment opportunity, 
especially for African Americans, Latinxs, and the poor. This Part will introduce 
labor redemption as a dignity interest in removal of unnecessary state-imposed 
barriers that interfere with the responsibility to find and keep work. Increasingly, 
the state has recognized this interest in “second chance” legislation, which permits 
individuals to seal or expunge old or minor records and provides markers of 
rehabilitation to the previously incarcerated. These reforms, alongside longstanding 
financial incentives to encourage hiring, have elevated labor redemption to an 
important right in work law, as explained in the next Part. 
A. Labor Redemption as a Dignitary Interest 
Labor redemption is rooted in dignity, a foundational idea in human rights 
discourse.71 While dignity has old roots,72 dignity as an individual right to respect 
and duty to respect others73 is reflected in the Enlightenment revolution in the 
United States. Thomas Paine called for recognition of the “natural dignity of man” 
as a status for all people,74 a concept of dignity also expressed in the Federalist Papers 
by Alexander Hamilton and in the correspondence of Thomas Jefferson.75 In this 
modern version of dignity, as explained by Ronald Dworkin, dignity requires 
recognition that treating people as less than a “full member of the human 
community” is both unjust and a denial of “political equality.”76 According to 
Jeremy Waldron, this more egalitarian version of dignity did not displace its 
 
criminal records] should reduce recidivism by mitigating each of these socioeconomic contributors to 
criminal behavior.” Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2521. 
71. MICHAEL ROSEN, DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING (2012); Arthur Chaskalson, 
Human Dignity as a Constitutional Value, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE 133, 134 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
72. Plato describes dignity as a reference to a person’s rank (adopted by the Romans), and early 
Christian theologians invoked dignity to distinguish humans from animals. Joern Eckert, Legal Roots of 
Human Dignity in German Law, in THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
DISCOURSE 41, 43 (David Kretzmer & Eckart Klein eds., 2002). 
73. This expression of dignity is most associated with Immanuel Kant, who wrote that human 
dignity is expressed in the human capacity for “moral autonomy and individuality.” Id. at 46. 
74. THOMAS PAINE, RIGHTS OF MAN 55 (1791). 
75. Michael J. Meyer, Introduction to THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND 
AMERICAN VALUES 1, 5–6 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992); William A. Parent, 
Constitutional Values and Human Dignity, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND 
AMERICAN VALUES 47, 69–70 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds., 1992) (quoting Hamilton 
in the Federalist Papers exhorting the adoption of the Constitution “for your liberty, your dignity, and 
your happiness”).  
76. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 198–99 (1977). 
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traditional association with a person’s role in society.77 Instead, “[h]igh rank was 
generalized rather than being simply repudiated.”78 In this formulation, “the 
modern notion of human dignity involves an upwards equalization of rank, so that 
we now try to accord to every human being something of the dignity, rank, and 
expectation of respect that was formerly accorded to nobility.”79  
While dignity is an undervalued interest in the United States as compared to 
Europe,80 it is constitutionally recognized. Dignity is protected in the First 
Amendment, which prohibits regulation of hateful speech, yet permits libel and 
defamation actions “to protect the dignity and reputation of the persons themselves, 
not to impose an aura of untouchability around their convictions.”81 The Thirteenth 
Amendment expresses a protection of the dignity interests of African Americans to 
be free from slavery.82 Chief Justice Warren invoked Paine’s words in announcing 
in Trop v. Dulles83 that “[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is 
nothing less than the dignity of man.”84 Dignity is a substantive due process right 
in the privacy cases of Whalen v. Roe85 and Nixon v. Administrator of General Services,86 
and especially in Obergefell v. Hodges,87 which insists that the right to marriage is 
fundamental to plaintiffs’ “equal dignity.”88  
Redemption, or the restoration of legal rights and removal of state-imposed 
stigmas, is reflected in the United States in bankruptcy law to forgive financial 
debts89 and in criminal law, for juveniles and through executive clemency. While the 
 
77. JEREMY WALDRON, DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 13–27, 34–36 (2012); Waldron, supra 
note 9, at 1118–19. Kant described the dignity of an individual in pre-modern society as a function of 
the rank of the individual, whether a duke, ambassador, judge, or bishop. Id. at 1119. 
78. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1119. 
79. Id. at 1120 (emphasis omitted). 
80. Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 519. 
81. Jeremy Waldron, Dignity and Defamation: The Visibility of Hate, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1596, 1613 
(2010); Andrew Koppelman, Waldron, Responsibility-Rights, and Hate Speech, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1201 (2011). 
82. Parent, supra note 75, at 69. 
83. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
84. Id. at 100. 
85. 429 U.S. 589, 599–600 (1977) (finding a substantive due process privacy “interest in 
avoiding disclosure of personal matters”). 
86. 433 U.S. 425, 457 (1977); cf. NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011) (assuming, without 
deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right of the sort mentioned in Whalen and Nixon, but 
holding that interest is outweighed by government’s interest as an employer and statutory privacy 
protections satisfy this privacy right). 
87. 576 U.S. 644 (2015). Kenji Yoshino argues that the right to marry is a responsibility-right. 
KENJI YOSHINO, SPEAK NOW: MARRIAGE EQUALITY ON TRIAL 97 (2015).  
88. Id. at 681 (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them 
that right.”); see Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 27–32 
(2015) (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion engaged in the “creative intertwining of the 
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses into a principle of equal dignity”); Kenji Yoshino, A New 
Birth of Freedom?: Obergefell v. Hodges, 129 HARV. L. REV. 147, 162–63, 169 (2015) (charting the right 
to equal dignity in Obergefell as a “substantive due process” right that “is not reducible to any formula, 
but is left instead to a common law methodology”).  
89. Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating Value in 
Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 731 (2018). 
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United States does not guarantee a general right to redemption in criminal law, the 
Eighth Amendment protection of juvenile offenders includes a right “to be 
forgiven.”90 This precludes the death penalty for juvenile offenders and requires 
individualized sentencing that takes account of the prospects for redemption, 
sharply limiting life sentences for juveniles.91 Some states have extended this right 
by banning the sentence of life without parole for juveniles.92 The U.S. Constitution 
also recognizes the executive power of clemency as a tool of corrective justice and 
to mitigate the undue severity of criminal sentences.93 
Individuals with a criminal record have a significant dignity interest in labor 
redemption, or the disruption of state-imposed barriers that unnecessarily interfere 
with the individual’s right to find and keep work after a criminal conviction. 
Criminal record history is a permanent status of inferiority, not unlike the ancient 
notion of dignity as rank. This inferior status interferes with its bearer’s ability to 
obtain material support and to gain acceptance and reintegration in the community 
after the sentence is complete. This interest justifies disruption of the stigma of a 
criminal record, particularly when the state requires work, and after the point at 
which the individual’s criminal record history does not suggest a significantly greater 
risk of future criminal activity than the general public. 
Labor redemption as a conceptual framework draws from the moral 
philosophy of Jeremy Waldron, especially his theory of responsibility-rights, and 
Michael Pinard’s human rights, dignity-based approach to reintegration. For 
Professor Waldron, some responsibilities have a “dual character” of rights, or  
responsibility-rights.94 Jury service, for example, is a responsibility required by the 
Seventh Amendment, in order to restrict judges with popular sovereignty, and 
compelled by threat of legal sanction.95 Jury service is also a right, entrusting 
ordinary individuals with legal decisionmaking in civil and criminal matters and is a 
measure of equal citizenship, as shown by successful campaigns by women for 
inclusion in jury service.96 Parents, too, have a legal obligation to care for their 
 
90. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005). 
91. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); see also Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 464  
(Fla. 2016) (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471) (explaining that Roper and Miller require sentencing courts 
to provide an individualized sentencing hearing to weigh the factors for determining a juvenile’s 
“diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform” when aggregate sentences are the functional 
equivalent of life without parole); Katherine Hunt Federle, Exploring the Parameters of a Child’s Right 
to Redemption: Some Thoughts, 68 S.C. L. REV. 487, 489–91 (2017). 
92. See, e.g., State v. Bassett, 394 P.3d 430, 446 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017), aff’d, 428 P.3d 343  
(Wash. 2018) (finding that statute permitting juvenile sentence of “a life without parole or early release 
sentence is unconstitutional under article I, section 14 of our state constitution”).  
93. Brian M. Hoffstadt, Normalizing the Federal Clemency Power, 79 TEX. L. REV. 561,  
572–88 (2001). 
94. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1116. 
95. Robert P. Burns, The Dignity, Rights, and Responsibilities of the Jury: On the Structure of 
Normative Argument, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1147, 1154 (2011). 
96. Waldron, supra note 9, at 1124–25. 
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children. But parenting “is not just a matter of submitting to a set of rules.”97 A 
parent must engage in “continual and active exercise of intelligence and choice; and 
these are her choices to make, her intelligence to exercise. She is privileged,” to 
make these choices, subject to limits imposed by the state.98 There is also an 
“outward-looking aspect” to this right.99 If a bystander disciplines another parent’s 
unruly child, the parent’s objection that discipline is her responsibility “is something 
like a right that she holds, but it is a right that is kind of synonymous with  
a responsibility.”100  
For Professor Waldron, jury service and parenting show the “dual character 
of right and responsibility.” A responsibility-right entails state “designation of an 
important task,” which is assigned to someone with a particular interest in it, and 
“the protection of their decision-making pursuant to this responsibility against 
interference by others and even by the state (except in extreme cases).”101  
Finding and keeping work after incarceration as a condition of release or in 
order to pay fines and penalties is a similar sort of responsibility. Release from 
incarceration is an upward equalization of rank, affording to the individual, after 
release, conditions that are denied in prison and jail. This includes the right, when 
employed after incarceration, to work in conditions that do not violate the 
Thirteenth Amendment—which expressly exempts prisoners102—as well as other 
employment rights that courts often find inapplicable to prison laborers.103 This 
transformation fits naturally with “the idea of role-based dignity and the idea of 
responsibility rights . . . .”104 The ability to find and keep work is itself an important 
right, as shown by the state requirement that individuals after incarceration obtain 
work as a condition of supervised release. Like jury service, the state entrusts the 
individual to select a range of work, but with state supervision to ensure that it 
comports with the requirements of supervised release. Finding and keeping work is 
also important for the individual as a means of material support and community 
reintegration, and for society as a marker of desistance. Given its importance and 
the state requirement to find and keep work as a condition of release, it is perverse 
for the state to simultaneously impose stigmas that unnecessarily reduce the capacity 
of individuals to find work.105 The role of the state in both requiring and prohibiting 
 
97. Id. at 1115–56 (discussing a parental legal right and responsibility to care for one’s children, 




101. Id. at 1116. 
102. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a 
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, 
or any place subject to their jurisdiction.”) (emphasis added). 
103. See generally Noah D. Zatz, Working at the Boundaries of Markets: Prison Labor and the 
Economic Dimension of Employment Relationships, 61 VAND. L. REV. 857, 870 (2008). 
104.  Waldron, supra note 9, at 1121. 
105. As Ben Laurence explains, there is a connection between responsibility-rights and capacity 
because assigning responsibilities to individuals who lack the capacity to perform them faces “a 
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work as a condition of release justifies a correlative right to be free from arbitrary 
state-imposed barriers to work. 
A human rights model of dignity also justifies the removal of state-imposed 
barriers that unnecessarily interfere with the individual’s ability to find and keep 
work after release from incarceration. Even after work is no longer a state 
requirement, it often remains essential for survival and community reintegration. 
Individuals with old or irrelevant criminal records maintain a dignity interest in relief 
from the stigma of these convictions in order to restore their dignity and reintegrate 
into the community. As Michael Pinard explains, in a human rights model, dignity 
is “the starting point for interpretation” of rights, instead of “an end point” rooted 
in a specific constitutional protection.106 It would seek to elevate the status of 
people after leaving incarceration “as much as possible, to their prior status, rather 
than impose broad legal restrictions that serve to degrade and marginalize them.”107 
As Professor Pinard argues, a dignity-based approach would remove collateral 
consequences that are not proportionate to the offense and that deepen racial 
disparities, and would also provide for mechanisms for relief to disrupt their lifetime 
stigma.108 While Professor Pinard identifies this dignity-based approach in other 
countries,109 as I will demonstrate in the next Section, recent second-chance reforms 
are an important step toward labor redemption as a right in the United States. 
In making the claim that there is a dignity interest in labor redemption, I do 
not contend that this dignity interest trumps all other interests or that weighing this 
interest against others poses no risks. Dignity interests can conflict with liberty and 
equality interests110 and can be balanced against these other values. Balancing these 
interests risks minimizing one or more of them, and private employers and courts 
are often ill suited for the task. Even worse, as some human rights scholars insist, 
dignity claims can conflate a humanist dignity principle with an older, status-based 
understanding of dignity as consonant with one’s rank in society.111 This  
status-based understanding of dignity can lead private employers and courts to 
 
powerful prima facie objection on the grounds of its apparent perversity.” Ben Laurence, The 
Responsibility-Form of Rights and Practical Capacities, 43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1223, 1224–25 (2011) 
106. Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 521. 
107. Id. at 526–27.  
108. Id. at 524–33. 
109. Professor Pinard locates this model in the conception of dignity rights of Canada, South 
Africa, and the European Court of Human Rights, which have struck down disenfranchisement policies 
on dignity grounds. Id. at 464, 521. 
110. As Martha Minow cautions, promoting legal forgiveness “may jeopardize the predictability, 
reliability, and equal treatment sought by the rule of law.” MARTHA MINOW, WHEN SHOULD LAW 
FORGIVE? 146 (2019). 
111. Margaret E. Johnson, Balancing Liberty, Dignity, and Safety: The Impact of Domestic 
Violence Lethality Screening, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 519, 550–51 (2010); Stéphanie Hennette-Vauchez, 
A Human Dignitas? Remnants of the Ancient Legal Concept in Contemporary Dignity Jurisprudence, 9 
INT’L J. CONST. L. 32, 53–56 (2011) (arguing that “dignitarian” prohibitions on conduct, such as 
prostitution and dwarf-throwing, on the ground that it demeans the self, owe more to the Roman 
concept of “dignitas” as respect afforded to individuals based on rank than the modern version of 
“human dignity for everybody”). 
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relegate people (and especially racial minorities) with criminal records to permanent 
second-class citizenship. I will discuss these risks, which justify state involvement 
to disrupt the stigma of criminal records, in Sections III.B–C. 
While the state may interfere with the dignity interests of individuals convicted 
of a crime,112 dignity requires that shaming must have a legitimate purpose. Once a 
record no longer indicates a heightened risk, there is little justification for making it 
available to employers. The only criminology theory that would make criminal 
records available to employers is general deterrence theory, on the ground that 
people who know they will be subject to an employer aversion will be less likely to 
engage in crime.113 This is a contestable claim, however, and must be weighed 
against the stigma of a criminal record, its magnification of racial bias, and its 
criminogenic effect. And it is no justification at all once the individual has 
rehabilitated.  
This insistence that the dignity interest of individuals released from 
incarceration requires freedom from arbitrary state-imposed barriers is aligned with 
the “crucial distinction” made by John Braithwaite in Crime, Shame and Reintegration 
between “shaming that is reintegrative and shaming that is disintegrative 
(stigmatization).”114 Reintegrative shaming does not offend dignity because its 
intent is to reaccept the individual into society, while disintegrative shaming violates 
dignity in both its expression of contempt and in undermining the individual’s 
capacity for dignity.115 Permanent stigmas that mark people with criminal records 
as inferior also impedes the equal citizenship of African Americans, Latinxs, and the 
poor, who disproportionately must find work in the shadow of the carceral state. 
B. Labor Redemption as a Right to Removal of Arbitrary Barriers to Work 
This Part has so far traced the dignity interest in labor redemption and argued 
that individuals with a criminal record have an interest in the disruption of stigmas 
that unnecessarily prevent work that is required for reintegration. This Section 
identifies in recent reentry reforms a series of rights with important implications for 
work law. 
 
112. ROSEN, supra note 7171, at 113 (“Dignity can be forfeited as a consequence of  
criminal actions.”). 
113. As Professor Jacobs explains, “[g]eneral deterrence is the only punishment theory that 
requires criminal records to be public.” JACOBS, supra note 49, at 222. 
114. BRAITHWAITE, supra note 9, at 55. 
115. Id. This is aligned with Professor Waldron’s view that dignity does not require allowing 
“people to evade legal coercion and punishment when that is appropriate; they just coerce and punish 
in what is ultimately a more respectful way.” WALDRON, supra note 77, at 146; see also Don Herzog, 
Aristocratic Dignity?, in DIGNITY, RANK, AND RIGHTS 99, 110 (Meir Dan-Cohen ed., 2012) (“[A]t stake 
in Waldron’s concern with how we treat criminals is that you can’t forfeit this kind of 
dignity . . . . [C]riminals still have claims on how we may and may not treat them . . . . [Otherwise we 
express] a kind of aristocratic contempt for the underlings.”). 
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Compared with other industrialized nations, labor redemption is a new topic 
in the United States and lacks federal elaboration.116 In contrast, redemption is an 
express right in most of Europe, requiring the removal of most unnecessary  
state-imposed barriers to work.117 In the United Kingdom, for example, completion 
of a “rehabilitation period” after committing some crimes entitles the individual to 
be “treated as a rehabilitated person . . . and that conviction for those purposes 
[will] be treated as spent [or expunged].”118 Employers in Germany, like other 
European countries, generally do not have access to criminal record history and may 
only ask about convictions if they are incompatible with a position.119 While recent 
federal bills, especially the REDEEM Act,120 have proposed reforms along these 
lines, there is no analogous federal right to redemption in the United States.  
Yet, the emerging trend in the United States, especially since the 2007 Second 
Chance Act, is for states to expand labor redemption rights through a vast array of 
policy innovations to encourage reintegration.121 Beginning with drug courts in the 
1990s, the United States has developed “a range of problem-solving courts serving 
low-level offenders in areas such as mental health, veteran’s affairs, and community 
reentry for formerly incarcerated citizens.”122 States have increasingly adopted 
rehabilitation programming as resources for these courts, including  
“post-incarceration mental health services, drug treatment programs, housing 
assistance, and job search help.”123  
While spanning a broad range of barriers to reintegration, easing the stigma of 
a criminal record as a marker of risk in employment figures prominently in  
second-chance legislative reforms. These reforms collectively establish a tripartite 
 
116. Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 502–06. 
117. The European Convention “prohibits treating inmates as if they are beyond redemption,” 
Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane Punishment to Constitutional 
Discourse, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 161 (2007), and “[i]nternational law has found that barriers to a 
prisoner’s successful reintegration violate his fundamental dignity rights,” id. at 166. “Outside of the 
United States, access to criminal records is far more limited and closely guarded.” Christopher Uggen 
& Robert Stewart, Piling on: Collateral Consequences and Community Supervision, 99 MINN. L. REV. 1871, 
1911 (2015). Most European countries automatically expunge convictions after a period of time. Id.; see 
also JACOBS, supra note 49, at 276. 
118. Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974, c. 53 (Eng.). 
119. JACOBS, supra note 49, at 276. 
120. H.R. 2410, 116th Cong. (2019) (proposing to seal or expunge federal nonviolent  
criminal offenses). 
121. The U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance has provided 900 grants to non-profit organizations, 
most often to provide employment-related reentry services to people who have a criminal record. See 
NAT’L REENTRY RES. CTR. & COUNCIL OF STATE GOV’TS JUST. CTR., REENTRY  
MATTERS: STRATEGIES AND SUCCESSES OF SECOND CHANCE ACT GRANTEES 1 (2018), https://
nationalreentryresourcecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Reentry-Matters-2018.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/AE5V-UQPA]. 
122. Jessica K. Steinberg, A Theory of Civil Problem-Solving Courts, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1579, 
1581 (2018); see, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 154–75 (2008) (criticizing the administrative design 
of reentry courts as too disconnected from “[t]he system of corrections[, which] is the primary body 
responsible for providing education and vocational training for inmates”). 
123. Radice, supra note 14, at 1357. 
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set of labor redemption rights: (1) to remove old and minor convictions from access 
by employers; (2) to provide markers of rehabilitation for the recently incarcerated 
for use in employment; and (3) to offer employers incentives to hire people with 
criminal records. 
1. Removal of Markers of Risk from Employment Consideration 
Over the past two years, twenty states have “created or broadened” access to 
sealing and expungement of minor convictions.124 These “clean slate” innovations 
remove the criminal record from consideration for employment purposes, either by 
deleting the record or restricting public access to it.125 While most of these require 
the person with a conviction to petition for relief, a number of states have sought 
to expand their use by automating sealing procedures. Pennsylvania in 2018 enacted 
the Clean Slate Act, becoming the first state to automatically seal convictions, in 
that instance of most misdemeanor convictions after 10 years without a subsequent 
conviction.126 One year after taking effect, Pennsylvania reported having removed 
about 35 million misdemeanor convictions from public view.127 Since then, 
Michigan, Utah, New Jersey, and California have also enacted their own clean slate 
legislation.128 Michigan’s 2020 legislation automatically expunges most felony 
convictions after ten years and misdemeanors after seven years.129 California 
requires the automatic expungement of low-level marijuana convictions130 and, 
effective 2021, most misdemeanor convictions after one year.131 Some states 
expressly link clean slate innovations to reentry programing, as in New Jersey, which 
provides for presumptive, automatic expungement of minor crimes for individuals 
who complete that state’s drug court program.132 
 
124. Alan Blinder, Convicts Seeking to Clear Their Records Find More Prosecutors Willing to Help, 
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/us/expungement-criminal-
justice.html [https://perma.cc/NK7S-8ANS]. 
125. Id. The terms “sealing” and “expungement” are technical and differ by state. Generally, 
expunging refers to the deletion of a criminal record from official repositories, except for the official 
court record, while sealing merely prevents access to records by third parties, such as employers. Jenny 
Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 324 (2015). 
126. 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9122.2 (2018).  
127. Laurie Mason Schroeder, In One Year, Pa.’s Clean Slate Law Has Erased 35 Million 
Crimes. What’s Next?, MORNING CALL ( June 30, 2020, 5:59 PM), https://www.mcall.com/news/
breaking/mc-nws-pennsylvania-clean-slate-law-one-year-20200630-ges77qb3ffahhiznbjzjtelq7q-story. 
html [https://perma.cc/2GJA-N9CG]. 
128. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-102(5)(a)(iii)(A) (West 2020) (establishing automatic 
expungement of misdemeanor convictions after five to seven years); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:52-5.3 to 
-5.4 (West 2020) (establishing task force to develop automated expungement process). 
129. Beth LeBlanc, Whitmer Signs ‘Clean Slate’ Legislation Aiming to Expand Expungement 
Opportunities, DET. NEWS (Oct. 12, 2020, 3:03 PM), https://www.detroitnews.com/ 
story/news/local/michigan/2020/10/12/whitmer-clean-slate-legislation-expanding-expungement/ 
5966512002/ [https://perma.cc/K3GF-4LD4]. 
130. Assemb. B. 1793, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). 
131. Assemb. B. 1076, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019). 
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-14 (West 2019). 
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2. Providing Markers of Rehabilitation for Employers 
Fourteen states additionally issue certificates of relief, which typically signal to 
the employer that the criminal record does not indicate a heightened risk in the 
workplace.133 Markers of rehabilitation are particularly important for individuals 
with more serious convictions that cannot be expunged or sealed. New York, for 
example, offers a Certificate of Relief from Disabilities as a form of sentencing 
relief, and a Certificate of Good Conduct after a waiting period at the discretion of 
sentencing judges or parole boards.134 Both create a rebuttable presumption of 
rehabilitation for future employment or occupational licensing requirements.135 
This requires evidence of a direct relationship between the job qualification and the 
conviction to support the denial.136  
3. Offering State Incentives for Hire 
The federal government for decades has provided bonding and insurance for 
employers who hire people with criminal records. The Federal Bonding Program 
insures employers in case of workplace theft by employees with a recent criminal 
record.137 Since 2015, the federal government has offered private employers a Work 
Opportunity Tax Credit who hire people with felony convictions.138 Six states 
provide analogous tax and bonding incentives for employers that hire people with 
recent convictions.139 
Taken together, labor redemption is legal entitlement to removal of a  
state-imposed stigma unrelated to actual risk to employers, co-workers, or 
customers. Imposing these legal obligations on the state is justified as a 
precondition for individuals to comply with the state requirement to find and keep 
work after release from incarceration. Reconceiving of employment rights for 
people with criminal records in this way expands employment protections without 
requiring new employment laws or imposing additional legal obligations on private 
 
133. See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5 / 5-5.5-15(f) (2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-173.2 (2019); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.25-G(2) (West 2020); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 8014 (2016); 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., REDUCING BARRIERS TO REINTEGRATION: FAIR CHANCE 
AND EXPUNGEMENT REFORMS IN 2018, at 3 (2019), http://ccresourcecenter.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/01/Fair-chance-and-expungement-reforms-in-2018-CCRC-Jan-2019.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/B9N2-WBQY]. Colorado permits petitioning for an “order of collateral relief” for almost all 
crimes as early as sentencing. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1.3-107 (2018). 
134. Radice, supra note 14, at 1367. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. 
137. About the FBP, FED. BONDING PROGRAM, http://www.bonds4jobs.com/program-
background.html [https://perma.cc/2NLG-3KPB] ( last visited Nov. 13, 2020). 
138. See Work Opportunity Tax Credit, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-
self-employed/work-opportunity-tax-credit [https://perma.cc/2T4F-YV6H] (Sept. 22, 2020) 
(describing $2,500 tax credit per hired individual with a criminal record). 
139. Those states are California, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, and Texas. See  
CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17053.34 (West 2019); LA. STAT. ANN. § 47:287.752 (2017); MD. CODE 
ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 11-702 (West 2016); TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.654 (West 2014); IOWA CODE  
§ 422.35 (2019). 
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employers. Further elaboration of labor redemption to counteract employer 
aversions based on factors other than bona fide risk are detailed in Part IV. 
III. ASSESSING LABOR REDEMPTION IN WORK LAW 
The previous Part argued that individuals have a dignity interest in labor 
redemption and reconceived recent second-chance reforms as a right to the state 
removal of unnecessary barriers to work necessary for reintegration.  
This Part will assess labor redemption in constitutional, statutory, and 
common law claims in the workplace. Labor redemption offers a stable 
constitutional ground for challenges to re-incarceration for failure to find work and 
denials of public employment and occupational licenses. Second-chance reforms 
resolve the structural weaknesses in Title VII and Ban the Box laws by providing 
plaintiffs with evidence of rehabilitation and shifting the costs of reintegration away 
from employers and to the state. They also permit courts to balance labor 
redemption against the security interests of customers and other third parties in 
negligent hiring claims. 
A. Constitutional Right to Challenge Re-Incarceration for Failure to Find Work, and 
State Denial of Public Employment and Occupational Licenses 
Constitutional recognition of redemption has historically been limited by the 
traditional distinction between the sentence imposed by a conviction and 
“collateral” consequences that result from a criminal conviction but are not a part 
of the sentence. Designation of state-imposed work barriers as “collateral” can place 
them beyond the reach of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments.140 Despite Sixth 
Amendment challenges to collateral consequences and theorization of further 
cracks in the formal division between direct and collateral consequences,141 
 
140. Courts have generally held that state denials of employment and occupational licenses are 
“collateral” consequences insufficiently connected to the criminal proceeding to implicate the Eighth 
Amendment. See Pinard, Collateral Consequences, supra note 9, at 521; Rasky v. Dep’t of Registration  
& Educ., 410 N.E.2d 69, 79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (finding that “revocation of a professional license is 
not a criminal sanction and the [E]ighth [A]mendment has no application here”); Booker v. City of 
New York, 14 Civ. 9801 (PAC) (HBP), 2017 WL 151625, at *6 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2017) (denying 
Eighth Amendment claim based on denial of employment because denial was not a part of a sentence 
and was unconnected to a criminal proceeding). 
141. The Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), found that removal 
proceedings for noncitizen offenders implicate the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel “because of its close connection to the criminal process,” its severe consequences for 
noncitizen offers, and the recent near-automatic removal requirements under immigration law. Id. at 
365–66. Courts have relied on Padilla to find a Sixth Amendment right to be advised that a guilty plea 
will result in sex offender registration and civil commitment. See Margaret Colgate Love, Collateral 
Consequences After Padilla v. Kentucky: From Punishment to Regulation, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 87, 
105–09 (2011). Paul Crane proposes to extend the reasoning of Padilla to require a jury trial under the 
Sixth Amendment for similarly severe collateral consequences, such as sex offender registration and 
extended firearm prohibitions. Paul T. Crane, Incorporating Collateral Consequences into Criminal 
Procedure, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 29-42 (2019). Jack Chin draws on the Supreme Court’s 
designation of civil death as a punishment that implicates Eighth Amendment scrutiny to argue that the 
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extending criminal procedure challenges to state-imposed barriers to work seems 
implausible in the short term.142 
Labor redemption, nonetheless, provides a stable ground for due process and 
equal protection challenges to incarceration for violating work mandates, and 
denials of public employment and occupational licenses because of criminal records. 
The necessity of labor redemption in order to secure the dignity of people with 
criminal records, and to comply with state work requirements, suggests an 
important due process right. Federal policy in the past three administrations 
encourages the reintegration of individuals into society after incarceration through 
work. Disrupting state-imposed stigmas that unnecessarily consign people with 
criminal records to a subclass of unemployable people is necessary to a well-ordered 
society in which eight percent of adults and one-third of African American adult 
males have a felony conviction.143 Permanent stigmatization of this population 
without an opportunity to show rehabilitation denies equal dignity to millions of 
members of racial minorities whose criminal records have relegated them to 
permanent second-class status. Reintegrating this population into the formal labor 
market requires the opportunity for people with criminal records to  
demonstrate rehabilitation. 
The most direct constitutional application of labor redemption is to the  
re-incarceration of individuals for failure to pay fines or penalties because of 
inability to find work. The Supreme Court in Bearden v. Georgia144 held that revoking 
probation for failure to pay a fine violates due process and equal protection unless 
the government “determin[es] that petitioner had not made sufficient bona fide 
efforts to pay or that adequate alternative forms of punishment did not exist.”145 
Bearden requires that the government, before re-incarcerating individuals for failure 
to obtain work or to pay fines or penalties, provide individuals with an opportunity 
to show that their joblessness is a result of barriers, and not unwillingness,  
to work.146 
 
entire network of collateral consequences taken together can comprise a “new civil death.” Gabriel  
J. Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1789, 
1825–26 (2012). Beth Colgan argues for Eighth Amendment scrutiny of suspension of public benefits, 
food stamps, and public housing as a violation of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 
akin to the abuse of civil forfeiture disapproved of in Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019). Beth  
A. Colgan, The Excessive Fines Clause: Challenging the Modern Debtor’s Prison, 65 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 2, 
16 (2018). 
142. As Professor Crane explains, collateral consequences are “varied and messy,” leaving 
“courts . . . understandably and predictably hesitant to widen those cracks given the incommensurability 
issues and line-drawing problems associated with incorporating collateral consequences.”  Crane, supra 
note 141, at 28.  
143. Shannon et al., supra note 21, at 13. 
144. 461 U.S. 660 (1983). 
145. Id. at 661–62. 
146. See, e.g., Brown v. McNeil, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1260–61 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (finding that 
revocation of conditional release for failure to pay fees despite testimony that petitioner had insufficient 
income to pay at the time violated due process); Johnson v. State, 707 S.E.2d 373, 375  
(Ga. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that revocation of probation for failure to pay fees violated due process 
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Labor redemption can also provide stable footing for due process challenges 
to denials of public employment and occupational licenses. While a criminal record 
harms reputation,147 the Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis148 held that reputational 
harm by itself is not a constitutional injury.149 Nor does reputational harm and a 
diffuse burdening of another interest, such as a “general fear of harm 
to . . . employment prospects” caused by an accurate but incomplete conviction 
history.150 Most courts of appeals have declined to recognize a federal constitutional 
right to privacy in government records suggesting criminal conduct.151 Reputational 
harm is insufficient on its own to create legal entitlement to redemption in  
most jurisdictions. 
Paul, nevertheless, declined to overrule precedent finding that state 
stigmatization of individuals with no notice or hearing violates due process152 and 
allowed that state-imposed stigmas can violate due process if they harm reputation 
and “more tangible interests.”153 Courts have since found the Paul stigma-plus test 
satisfied in cases in which allegations of criminal conduct causes harm to reputation 
 
because the state failed to consider testimony that petitioner diligently looked for but could not find 
work and had no family resources). 
147. Extending Bernadette Atuahene’s theory of a “dignity taking,” Jamila Jefferson-Jones 
argues that a criminal record’s “ongoing damage to [the] reputation” of a person with a conviction can 
constitute a dignity taking that frustrates the individual’s “investment-backed expectations” to 
reintegrate into society. Jefferson-Jones, supra note 50, at 868 (discussing Bernadette Atuahene, Dignity 
Takings and Dignity Restoration: Creating a New Theoretical Framework for Understanding Involuntary 
Property Loss and the Remedies Required, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 796, 799 (2016)). But Professor 
Jefferson-Jones rightly does not argue that reputation alone can establish a due process entitlement 
under the U.S. Constitution. See id. at 870–74 (analogizing the previously incarcerated individual’s 
“investment-backed expectations” in rehabilitation with those of real property owners). 
148. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
149. See id. at 712 (finding that publication of plaintiff’s name as an “active shoplifter” by police 
after arrest did not violate due process because “the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither 
‘liberty’ nor ‘property’ guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law”). 
150. Filteau v. Prudenti, 161 F. Supp. 3d 284, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2016). 
151. Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (finding no privacy interest in 
expunged criminal record); Willan v. Columbia Cnty., 280 F.3d 1160, 1162 (7th Cir. 2002); Nilson  
v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (rejecting claim that individual has a protected interest 
against disclosure of expunged criminal record). 
152. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (labeling of individual as alcoholic and 
posting of person’s name in all liquor outlets prohibiting sale to individual by state without notice or 
hearing violates due process). 
153. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701–02. 
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and the loss of public-sector employment,154 denial or revocation of an occupational 
license,155 state assignment of sex offender status,156 and denial of parole.157 
Labor redemption can form a basis for a constitutional challenge to denial of 
public employment and state occupational licensing restrictions, under the  
stigma-plus standard. In these instances, due process requires, at minimum, a nexus 
between the conviction and the qualifications for the position.158 Categorical hiring 
and licensing bans for people with felony convictions fail to meet this nexus 
requirement and do not survive equal protection rational basis review.159 Mississippi 
in Chunn v. State ex rel. Mississippi Department of Insurance160 is emblematic of this 
widely held view. That case involved a denied application to renew a bail-agent 
license by an individual who previously held a license as a bail agent in the state for 
twenty years, because of a new state law imposing a lifetime bar for applicants with 
felony convictions.161 The individual had been convicted of marijuana possession 
thirty years before.162 Reasoning that rational basis review requires a showing of a 
“rational relation to some legitimate end” or a “legitimate government interest,” the 
 
154. See, e.g., Horner v. Cnty. Bd., 828 F. Supp. 604, 608–10 (C.D. Ill. 1993) (dismissing  
public-sector employee and falsely accusing employee of fraud satisfies stigma plus requirement). 
155. See, e.g., Burns v. Alexander, 776 F. Supp. 2d 57, 80–83 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that the 
public accusation of child abuse that resulted in loss of license to operate child care facility satisfies 
stigma plus standard). 
156. See Chambers v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 205 F.3d 1237, 1242–43 (10th Cir. 2000); Lindsey 
Webb, The Procedural Due Process Rights of the Stigmatized Prisoner, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1055,  
1075–79 (2013). In these cases, designation of sex offender status interferes with reputation and  
liberty interests. 
157. A denial of parole based, in part, on an erroneous notation of a murder conviction in a 
pre-sentence report satisfies stigma-plus because it is a “material state-imposed burden or  
state-imposed alteration of plaintiff’s status or rights.” Hall v. Marshall, 479 F. Supp. 2d 304, 314 
(E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
158. I have previously argued in favor of a “nexus” requirement, which would require an 
employer to conclude that a criminal record is directly related to a job responsibility before taking 
adverse action. Andrew Elmore, Civil Disabilities in an Era of Diminishing Privacy: A Disability 
Approach for the Use of Criminal Records in Hiring, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 991, 1030–34 (2015). 
159. See, e.g., Barletta v. Rilling, 973 F. Supp. 2d 132, 138–39 (D. Conn. 2013) (finding that a 
refusal to grant a license to trade in precious metals to any applicant “convicted of any felony” violates 
equal protection because there is no rational basis for a categorical disqualification); Furst  
v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 631 F. Supp. 1331, 1336–38 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“[A] municipal employer[, to 
survive rational basis review,] must demonstrate some relationship between the commission of a 
particular felony and the inability to adequately perform a particular job.”); Kindem v. City of Alameda, 
502 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (finding that a ban on hiring any individual with a felony 
conviction “is not rationally related to any legitimate state interests”); Butts v. Nichols, 381  
F. Supp. 573, 574 (S.D. Iowa 1974) ( “[A]n across-the-board prohibition against the employment of 
felons in civil service positions” fails rational basis review.); Smith v. Fussenich, 440 F. Supp. 1077, 
1082 (D. Conn. 1977) (holding that automatic disqualification of any applicant convicted of a felony 
for a private investigator and security guard license violates equal protection because there was no 
rational basis). 
160. 156 So. 3d 884 (Miss. 2015). 
161. Id. at 884.  
162. Id. at 885. 
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Mississippi Supreme Court held that a flat ban fails even the “lenient” rational  
basis test.163  
Labor redemption further requires an individualized risk assessment before 
denial of public employment and occupational licenses.164 Pennsylvania, which 
constitutionally protects reputation,165 shows how labor redemption can ground this 
due process challenge. While Pennsylvania finds that reputation as a substantive 
due process right is not fundamental, the deprivation “must not be unreasonable, 
unduly oppressive or patently beyond the necessities of the case, and the means 
which it employs must have a real and substantial relation to the objects sought to 
be attained.”166 Pennsylvania has relied on the right to reputation to constitutionally 
protect the right to expungement of arrest records following acquittal,167 to reverse 
denials of public employment based on a flat ban on hiring people with criminal 
record histories168 or a lifetime ban for felony convictions,169 to strike down a 
lifetime juvenile sex registration provision,170 and to protect the “right to engage in 
any of the common occupations of life.”171 Applying its version of a rational basis 
test, a Pennsylvania court, for example, found a ten-year felony conviction ban as 
applied to a groundskeeper to a school violated due process because there was no 
evidence that the employee’s seven-year-old conviction for lying on an application 
for a firearm directly related to his ability to “diligently, faithfully, and honestly mow 
lawns and trim bushes at [employer’s] behest.”172 Consistent with this approach, 
 
163. Id. at 886. 
164. Thompson v. Gallagher, 489 F.2d 443, 449 (5th Cir. 1973) (striking down on equal 
protection grounds an “ordinance which bars that class of persons from city employment, without any 
consideration of the merits of each individual case”). This point is similar to Miriam Aukerman’s 
argument that the irrebuttable presumption doctrine applies to occupational license restrictions. See 
Miriam J. Aukerman, The Somewhat Suspect Class: Towards a Constitutional Framework for Evaluating 
Occupational Restrictions Affecting People with Criminal Records, 7 J.L. SOC’Y 18, 76 (2005). 
165. Article I, Section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantees “certain inherent and 
indefeasible rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, 
possessing and protecting property and reputation.” PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
166. Gambone v. Commonwealth, 101 A.2d 634, 637 (Pa. 1954). 
167. Commonwealth v. D.M., 695 A.2d 770 (Pa. 1997). 
168. Sec’y of Revenue v. John’s Vending Corp., 309 A.2d 358, 362 (Pa. 1973) (finding that “a 
blanket prohibition barring anyone who has been convicted of a crime of moral turpitude without 
regard to the remoteness of those convictions or the individual’s subsequent performance would  
be unreasonable”). 
169. See, e.g., Johnson v. Allegheny Intermediate Unit, 59 A.3d 10 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012) 
(finding that a lifetime ban on employees with felony convictions in public schools violates due 
process); Croll v. Harrisburg Sch. Dist., No. 210 M.D. 2012, 2012 WL 8668130, at *7  
(Pa. Commw. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (finding that a lifetime ban violates due process because there is “no 
temporal proximity to his present ability to perform the duties of [plaintiff’s] position, and . . . does not 
bear a real and substantial relationship to the” position). 
170. In re J.B., 107 A.3d 1, 16–17 (Pa. 2014). 
171. Johnson, 59 A.3d at 20. 
172. Megraw v. Sch. Dist. of Cheltenham Twp., No. 577 C.D. 2017, 2018 WL 2012130, at *9 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. May 1, 2018). 
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labor redemption requires a name-clearing hearing for permanent occupational bars 
and categorical denial of public employment.173 
B. Removal of Structural Limitations of Title VII and Ban the Box Laws 
The United States primarily regulates employer rejections of people with 
criminal records under the equality protection of Title VII disparate impact theory, 
and, to a lesser extent, state and local “Ban the Box” privacy restrictions. Title VII 
does not consider people with criminal records to be a protected class, but the 
EEOC in 2012 issued guidance instructing employers of its view that background 
checks have a disparate impact on African Americans and Latinxs.174 Automatically 
excluding individuals because of a criminal record, accordingly, “would need to be 
narrowly tailored to identify criminal conduct with a demonstrably tight nexus to 
the position in question.”175 Second, thirty-five states and 150 local governments 
have enacted “Ban the Box” laws, regulating the timing of when an employer may 
ask about a criminal record, typically until the interview stage. While most of Ban 
the Box laws regulate public employment, twelve states extend this protection to 
private-sector employers as well.176  
Title VII and Ban the Box laws, however, provide little protection against the 
broad exclusion of people with criminal records from the workforce. This Section 
will first explain how structural limitations blunt the effectiveness of these laws and 
then show how labor redemption as reflected in clean slate reforms resolves these 
structural limitations.  
1. People with Criminal Records Are Not a Protected Class Under Title VII, and 
Employers Often Prevail in Showing a Business Necessity for Background Checks in 
Title VII Disparate Impact Claims 
People with criminal records have a limited claim to equality in the United 
States, which is often outweighed by the employer’s interest in public safety. Federal 
equality protections, reflected in Title VII, seek to minimize the role of morally 
arbitrary factors in employment177 and dismantle the long-term consequences of 
 
173. See, e.g., Segal v. City of New York, 459 F.3d 207, 214 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that “an 
adequate, reasonably prompt, post-termination name-clearing hearing” satisfies the procedural 
requirement of a stigma-plus claim by individual terminated from public-sector, at-will employment). 
174. EEOC GUIDANCE, supra note 7. 
175. Id. 
176. See BETH AVERY, NAT’L EMPLOYMENT LAW PROJECT, BAN THE BOX 1 (2019), https:/
/s27147.pcdn.co/wp-content/uploads/Ban-the-Box-Fair-Chance-State-and-Local-Guide-April19.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BB6E-FFPD]. 
177. Liberal egalitarianism seeks to avoid harm for morally arbitrary reasons and prohibits 
discrimination against an employee “for the morally arbitrary reason that she belongs to a protected 
group.” Noah D. Zatz, The Minimum Wage as a Civil Rights Protection: An Alternative to Antipoverty 
Arguments?, 2009 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 27. Fair equality of opportunity, according to John Rawls, 
justifies dismantling inherited social advantages, including on the basis of race, sex and class, on the 
ground that people with the same talent and willingness should have the same prospects. JOHN RAWLS, 
A THEORY OF JUSTICE 72–73 (1971). 
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entrenched group-based inequalities.178 But Title VII leaves in place other employer 
decisions, even if grounded in group-based assumptions, so long as those 
assumptions do not cause “greater harm to the groups that are on the ‘wrong’ side 
of society’s stereotypical judgments.”179 This equality protection “concerns itself 
only with those kinds of stigma that are plainly unjustified,”180 while permitting 
others, such as stigmas imposed by the state for criminal conduct.181 
Limiting employment discrimination protections to groups on the wrong side 
of stereotypical judgments rests on contestable claims about who is deserving of 
protections.182 Jessica Clarke criticizes this limitation, which “focuses attention on 
the victims of discrimination and their blameworthy or costly choices, rather than 
the systemic effects of biases that are not required for the workplace to function,” 
and “reinforces stereotypes of the sort that antidiscrimination law is intended to 
disrupt.”183 To address this limitation, Joseph Fishkin offers an “opportunity 
pluralism” theory of equal opportunity, which would justify restrictions on any 
employer policy that constricts opportunity structures whether or not they burden 
a particular protected class.184 While offering an important critique of stigma theory, 
however, opportunity pluralism does not provide an answer to conflicting rights, in 
this case between people with markers of risk seeking employment, and employers, 
consumers, and co-workers seeking workplaces free of violence and theft.185 
Perhaps for this reason, while Australia and some states in the United States 
consider people with criminal records a protected class,186 similar extension of Title 
VII seems implausible. 
 
178. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, THE LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 62 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT]; Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, “Rational Discrimination,” Accommodation, and the Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 
VA. L. REV. 825, 839–45 (2003) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Rational Discrimination ]. 
179. BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT, supra note 178, at 62. 
180. ANDREW KOPPELMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 72 (1996). 
181. John Brest, The Substance of Process, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 131, 141 (1981) (describing stigmas 
for criminal conduct as an example of those that are “permissible or even desirable”). 
182. Jessica Clarke characterizes this dividing line as the “new immutability” that defines 
protected characteristics as those essential to personal identity, to separate characteristics such as 
disability from other forms of discrimination, such as “obesity, pregnancy, and criminal records.” Jessica 
A. Clarke, Against Immutability, 125 YALE L.J. 2, 10 (2015). Joseph Fishkin argues that viewing moral 
arbitrariness as solely a function of advantages from birth ignores the problem of “bleak opportunities” 
that are the result of a person’s past failures. JOSEPH FISHKIN, BOTTLENECKS: A NEW THEORY OF 
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY 239–53 (2014). 
183. Clarke, supra note 182, at 11–12. 
184. For Professor Fishkin, restrictions on employer inquiries about height, weight, receipt of 
public assistance, place of birth, or criminal records are all justified on opportunity pluralism grounds. 
FISHKIN, supra note 182, at 239–53. 
185. See, e.g., Jack N. Kondrasuk, Herff L. Moore & Hua Wang, Negligent Hiring: The Emergent 
Contributor to Workplace Violence in the Public Sector, 30 PUB. PERS. MGMT. 185, 187 (2001). 
186. Elena Larrauri Pijoan, Legal Protections Against Criminal Background Checks in Europe, 16 
PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 50, 57 (2014) (using Australia as an example); NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES, STATE EMPLOYMENT-RELATED DISCRIMINATION STATUTES 3–13 (2015), https://
www.ncsl.org/documents/employ/Discrimination-Chart-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/XB9J-JVJC]. 
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Criminal background checks can nonetheless violate Title VII under a 
disparate treatment187 or a disparate impact theory.188 Courts, however, are reluctant 
to extend equality protections to people with criminal records, unless the employer’s 
background check is facially overbroad, applied in an obviously discriminatory 
fashion, or the candidate can demonstrate her own rehabilitation.  
A disparate treatment claim must overcome the employer’s defense that the 
criminal record is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for nonhire with evidence 
creating an inference of discriminatory animus,189 typically through comparator 
evidence. But courts can structure the similarly situated evidence requirement190 in 
ways that can be impossible to obtain. In Rogers v. Pearland Independent School 
District,191 for example, the Fifth Circuit rejected a Title VII disparate treatment 
claim based on evidence that the plaintiff, who is Black, was not hired because he 
failed to disclose drug-related convictions despite the employer’s hiring of a white 
candidate who also failed to disclose a drug-related conviction. Affirming the trial 
court, the appellate court found that the white applicant was not a “legitimate 
comparator” because the Black candidate had three drug-related convictions while 
the white candidate had only one.192 This proof structure requires plaintiffs to show 
identical reasons for nonhire and an identical criminal record, a heightened burden 
that often cannot be met, particularly in smaller workplaces.193 As the partial dissent 
in Rogers noted, requiring both identical reasons for the employment action and 
identical underlying circumstances “effectively immunizes employers from 
 
187. Under a disparate treatment theory, employers may violate Title VII in rejecting applicants 
with a criminal record if the rejection is because of race or national origin, as shown by the employer’s 
preferential treatment of white applicants with similar criminal record histories. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). 
As the EEOC Guidance notes, Pager’s findings of racial disparities in how employers perceive the risk 
of equivalent criminal records reported by in-person applicants suggests that rejections because of 
criminal record history can be because of race or national origin discrimination. See EEOC GUIDANCE, 
supra note 7, at 34–35 n.55. 
188. In a Title VII disparate impact theory, an employer’s criminal background check policy 
may be unlawful even without evidence of unlawful intent, if the policy adversely impacts racial 
minorities without sufficient employer justification. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k). 
189. See, e.g., Williams v. Atl. Health Sys., No. 15-cv-06366, 2017 WL 1900725, at *6  
(D.N.J. May 8, 2017) (dismissing Title VII disparate treatment claim because criminal record was a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for revocation of hire). 
190. A prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII can require a showing that the 
plaintiff was treated differently from a “similarly situated” individual outside the protected class.  
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258–59 (1981). 
191. 827 F.3d 403 (5th Cir. 2016). 
192. Id. at 410. The Fifth Circuit “nearly identical” requirement for comparators has been 
criticized by the Eleventh Circuit as unnecessarily rigid. Lewis v. City of Union City, 918 F.3d 1213, 
1224 (11th Cir. 2019); see also Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 846 (7th Cir. 2012) (permitting use 
of comparator evidence to show intent if “the distinctions between the plaintiff and the proposed 
comparators are not so significant that they render the comparison effectively useless” (internal 
quotations and citation omitted)). 
193. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 764 (2011) 
(critiquing similarly situated requirement for limiting intersectional claims). 
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disparate treatment claims unless the plaintiff is able to show that he shares identical 
traits with the alleged comparator.”194 
Because disparate impact requires no evidence of discriminatory intent, Title 
VII disparate impact litigation has had more success in challenging criminal record 
prohibitions.195 This requires an initial showing that the employment practice has a 
disparate impact on a protected class, after which the burden of production shifts 
to the employer to show that the policy is job related and consistent with business 
necessity.196 The EEOC Guidance has persuaded some courts to deny employer 
motions to dismiss these complaints based on data showing national arrest and 
conviction disparities by race and national origin.197 But here too, courts often 
impose heightened proof structures that limit the reach of these disparate impact 
challenges. Courts often reject the use of national data to show a disparity and 
express skepticism about the accuracy of plaintiff’s statistical analysis of  
employer data.198 
The most important structural limitation to Title VII is a broad construction 
of the employer’s defense that the criminal record exclusion is job related and 
consistent with business necessity. The business necessity defense requires courts 
to balance the equality interests of applicants with criminal records against the risk 
 
194. 827 F.3d at 410 (Graves, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Suzanne Goldberg 
argues that the similarly situated requirement forces plaintiffs to identify a “coworker who not only has 
comparable job responsibilities and lacks the same protected trait but also has the same unprotected 
attribute,” a heightened burden that often cannot be met, particularly in smaller workplaces. Goldberg, 
supra note 193.  
195.  See, e.g., Order Granting Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Preliminary Approval of Class 
Action Settlement, Conditional Certification of Settlement Class, Appointment of Class Counsel, and 
Approval of Plaintiffs' Proposed Notice of Settlement, Fortune Soc’y, Inc. et al. v. Macy's, Inc.,  
19-cv-05961 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 4, 2020), ECF No. 105 (approving class settlement of Title VII disparate 
impact challenge to criminal background check in hiring); Times v. Target Corp., No. 18 Civ. 02993, 
2019 WL 5616867, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2019) (approving class settlement of claim); Little  
v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 313 F. Supp. 3d 27, 32 (D.D.C. 2018), appeal dismissed, No. 18-7071, 
2018 WL 4600770 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 11, 2018) (same). 
196. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). 
197. See, e.g., Lee v. Hertz Corp., 330 F.R.D. 557, 561 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (denying motion to 
dismiss disparate impact challenge by Latinx candidate of employer ban on hiring anyone with a criminal 
record because of general disparities in criminal record histories); Williams v. Compassionate Care 
Hospice, No. 16-2095, 2016 WL 4149987, at *5 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 2016) (adopting EEOC Guidance 
position that national racial disparities in criminal record histories suffice to survive motion to dismiss); 
McCain v. United States, No. 2:14-cv-92, 2015 WL 1221257, at *17 (D. Vt. Mar. 17, 2015) (same). 
198. See Manley v. Lyondell Chem. Co., No. H-19-4987, 2020 WL 3038132, at *6  
(S.D. Tex. May 10, 2020), report and recommendation adopted by No. H-19-4987, 2020 WL 3036308  
(S.D. Tex. June 5, 2020) (granting motion to dismiss, rejecting general statistics showing conviction 
disparities by race); Mandala v. NTT Data, Inc., 18-CV-6591, 2019 WL 3237361, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. July 
18, 2019) (same); see also Elmore, supra note 158, at 1016–20 (discussing EEOC v. Freeman, 961  
F. Supp. 2d 783 (D. Md. 2013); EEOC v. Kaplan Higher Learning Educ. Corp., No. 1:10 CV 2882, 
2013 WL 322116 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 28, 2013)). The Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC Guidance is not 
enforceable and enjoined its enforcement in Texas. See Texas v. EEOC, 933 F.3d 433, 451 (5th  
Cir. 2019) (finding that EEOC Guidance is not enforceable because the EEOC “lacks authority to 
promulgate substantive rules implementing Title VII”). 
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signaled by a criminal record.199 But courts often lack sufficient information to 
assess the bona fide risk of a criminal record.200 At times courts have reacted to this 
tension in ways that minimize equality interests in Title VII disparate impact claims 
or adopt a status-based, racialized view of dignity.201 
Even for more reasoned attempts to grapple with this tension, the conflicting 
rights at stake place important limitations on the reach of Title VII disparate impact 
analysis. These courts recognize that Title VII prohibits employer criminal 
background checks that would create a subclass of unemployable individuals. But 
courts often reject these Title VII claims so long as the employer’s criminal 
background check is facially reasonable. In those cases, courts impose a heightened 
requirement on plaintiffs to show their rehabilitation. This proof structure greatly 
limits the reach of Title VII disparate impact claims in this area. 
The two leading Title VII disparate impact cases challenging background 
checks, Green v. Missouri Pacific Railroad202 and El v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 
Transportation Authority,203 demonstrate how Title VII recognizes labor redemption 
and equality as independent, important interests, even as structural limitations in 
Title VII disparate impact theory narrow its reach. In Green, the Eighth Circuit 
considered whether an employer’s practice of excluding from employment all 
individuals with a criminal conviction, except minor traffic offenses, was justified 
by business necessity.204 The Eighth Circuit first analyzed the comparable interests 
of the parties, finding that the employer had a low interest in the policy, having 
failed to validate it or show that a less restrictive test would not suffice.205 It then 
found that the policy burdens the labor redemption interests of people with criminal 
records, who would be automatically placed “in the permanent ranks of the 
unemployed.”206 Lastly, it found that this policy separately interferes with the 
equality interests of “blacks who have suffered and still suffer from the burdens of 
 
199. Courts can sometimes avoid this confrontation by relying on an employer’s obvious failure 
to consider the qualifications of candidates with criminal records. See Guerrero v. Cal. Dep’t of  
Corr. & Rehab., 119 F. Supp. 3d 1065, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded, 701 
F. App’x 613 (9th Cir. 2017) (finding EEOC Guidance persuasive, and holding that employer’s “lip 
service” about the risk of applicant based on criminal record history was insufficient to show a business 
necessity). A balancing of interests is also unnecessary if the background check policy is legally required. 
See Williams v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 901 F.3d 1036, 1041 (8th Cir. 2018) (affirming dismissal of 
disparate impact claim because statute prohibited hire). 
200. FISHKIN, supra note 182, at 232–34, 252; Elmore, supra note 158, at 1020–29. 
201. One court, in dismissing a Title VII disparate impact claim, admonished that “[i]f 
Hispanics do not wish to be discriminated against because they have been convicted of theft then, they 
should stop stealing.” EEOC v. Carolina Freight Carriers Corp., 723 F. Supp. 734, 753 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
202. 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975). 
203. 479 F.3d 232 (3d Cir. 2007). 
204. 523 F.2d at 1296. 
205. Id. at 1298.  
206. Id. at 1299. 
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discrimination in our society.”207 It found that this “unnecessarily harsh and unjust 
burden” violated Title VII.208 
While Green established limitations on the categorical exclusion of people with 
criminal records under Title VII, the Third Circuit in El clarified that in cases where 
employer background checks are facially reasonable, they do not violate Title VII 
unless the plaintiff can demonstrate individualized rehabilitation.209 The plaintiff in 
El had a forty-year-old conviction for second-degree murder when he was 15.210 He 
sought and was rejected for a position as a paratransit bus driver under the 
employer’s criminal record policy, which excluded any individual with “any crime 
of moral turpitude or of violence.”211 The Third Circuit held that to establish a 
business necessity defense under Title VII the employer need only show that the 
check can “accurately distinguish between applicants that pose an unacceptable level 
of risk and those that do not.”212 In light of the position, which required the 
employee to be alone with and in “close proximity to vulnerable members of 
society,”213 evidence that even a forty-year-old record presents a heightened risk 
was sufficient to dismiss the Title VII claim.214 While the court acknowledged the 
harshness of a lifetime ban for criminal convictions, it held that the risk of harm to 
paratransit passengers with physical or mental disabilities, who are often the targets 
of “sexual and violent criminals,”215 justifies a lifetime ban if it decreases the risk  
of harm. 
Trial courts since El have generally followed this pattern, permitting Title VII 
claims alleging that a background check has a disparate impact in instances in which 
the plaintiff can demonstrate rehabilitation, while rejecting challenges to facially 




209. See El v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 242–45 (3d Cir. 2007).  
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 236. 
212. Id. at 245. 
213. Id. at 243. 
214. In El, the plaintiff did not challenge SEPTA’s expert testimony about recidivism rates or 
put forward his own experts to create a factual question for the jury, and “suffere[d] pre-trial judgment 
for it.” Id. at 247. 
215. Id. at 245. 
216. Title VII disparate impact claims are most often successful if the plaintiff already has a 
positive work history for the employer before being fired by the employer because of a background 
check. See, e.g., Waldon v. Cincinnati Pub. Schs., 941 F. Supp. 2d 884, 888–92 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (finding 
that plaintiffs, employed by the defendant and then terminated because of the results of a background 
check, “posed no obvious risk due to their past convictions, but rather, were valuable and respected 
employees, who merited a second chance”). Otherwise, these claims typically fail. See, e.g., Foxworth  
v. Pa. State Police, 402 F. Supp. 2d 523, 535–36 (E.D. Pa. 2005), aff’d, 228 F. App’x 151 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(finding automatic criminal record disqualification for police officers justified by business necessity); 
Fletcher v. Berkowitz Oliver Williams Shaw & Eisenbrandt, LLP, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1031  
(W.D. Mo. 2008) (rejecting Title VII disparate impact claim for denial of employment in law office for 
nearly thirty-year-old rape conviction on public safety grounds). 
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El v. SEPTA illuminates the structural limitation of Title VII disparate impact 
challenges of employer criminal background checks. Courts respond to the 
uncertainty and complexity of individualized risk assessments by deferring to an 
employer’s facially reasonable background check, without requiring the employer to 
assess the individual’s rehabilitation. Courts instead place the burden on plaintiffs 
to show their rehabilitation, which plaintiffs are ill equipped to meet.217  
A reexamination of El v. SEPTA shows how this limitation in the Title VII 
disparate impact proof structure can systematically bias disparate impact claims by 
people with criminal records. The Third Circuit’s holding hinged on expert 
testimony that “former violent criminals who have been crime free for many years 
are at least somewhat more likely than members of the general population to 
commit a future violent act.”218 But, taking account of the age of the applicant and 
the time elapsed after the conviction, the plaintiff in El would have been a less risky 
hire than a person from the general population, by virtue of his advanced age and 
forty-year clean record.219 This is because, generally, “older people who have served 
substantial sentences recidivate infrequently.”220 
This is not to suggest that the Third Circuit incorrectly applied Title VII or 
unreasonably denied El’s claim. Instead, El demonstrates how judicial skepticism 
of Title VII disparate impact theory221 can manifest in proof structures that are 
difficult, or impossible, for people with criminal records to meet. In light of the 
contestable nature of the equality claim of people with criminal records, along with 
legitimate public safety objections, extension of Title VII to address these structural 
limitations is implausible. 
2. Ban the Box Laws Delay but Do Not Prohibit Criminal Background Checks, and 
May Increase Employer Disparate Treatment of African Americans 
The most important limitation to Ban the Box laws is that they do not limit 
employer consideration of a criminal record history past the interview stage. This 
limited privacy protection furthers the purpose of Ban the Box laws to encourage 
employers to engage in a deliberative process with applicants. Prohibiting employers 
 
217. In El, the Third Circuit granted summary judgment to the employer because the plaintiff 
did not, or could not afford to, produce a conflicting expert report to create a triable issue for the jury. 
El, 479 F.3d at 276. 
218. Id. at 246–47. 
219. Shawn D. Bushway, Paul Nieuwbeerta & Arjan Blokland, The Predictive Value of Criminal 
Background Checks: Do Age and Criminal History Affect Time to Redemption?, 5 CRIMINOLOGY 27,  
28–30, 52 (2011). 
220. J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle & Sonja B. Starr, Understanding Violent-Crime Recidivism, 95 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1643, 1695 (2020). In a large, recent sample of individuals incarcerated for 
murder or non-negligent manslaughter, J.J. Prescott, Benjamin Pyle, and Sonja Starr found that none of 
the individuals released at age fifty-five or older recidivate. Id. at 1696. 
221. The rejection of the need for an individualized assessment in the Title VII business 
necessity defense, in particular, may in part stem from a growing judicial resistance to disparate impact 
theory. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,  
714–16 (2006). 
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from preemptively and categorically excluding applicants with criminal histories 
affords applicants an opportunity to first impress upon employers their interests 
and qualifications for the position. This permits employers, in theory, to consider 
the applicant’s criminal record history in context. But without a baseline protection 
against overbroad background checks later in the hiring process, it is unclear 
whether Ban the Box laws reduce employer aversions to people with  
criminal records.222 
A separate obstacle to extending privacy protections is that employers may 
respond to Ban the Box laws by discriminating against individuals based on 
stereotypes that associate racial minorities with workplace risk, sometimes referred 
to as statistical discrimination.223 Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr found that in states 
that enacted Ban the Box, these laws improved the job prospects of people with 
criminal records but substantially increased the Black-white gap in people who were 
called back for interviews.224 They conclude that Ban the Box laws may substantially 
increase the employment gap between whites and African Americans.225  
To be sure, the conclusions and policy implications of this study are 
contested.226 Even if there is a loss in employment from privacy protections, further 
study will be necessary to assess whether it is temporary or more entrenched. But it 
seems plausible that pre-hiring inquiry restrictions may trigger employer 
stereotyping of protected classes,227 causing at least a short-term dip in employment 
or wages. Employment discrimination law prohibits statistical discrimination,228 and 
 
222. See Elmore, supra note 158, at 1014–15. 
223. Harry Holzer, Steven Raphael, and Michael Stoll found that employers who conduct 
background checks are more likely to hire African Americans, especially if the employer reports an 
aversion to criminal records. They hypothesize that employers engage in hiring discrimination against 
African Americans as a form of “statistical discrimination,” to screen out candidates who they assume 
have criminal records. Harry J. Holzer, Steven Raphael & Michael Stoll, Perceived Criminality, Criminal 
Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 463, 473 (2006); 
see Elmore, supra note 158, at 1035-36; Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Privacy Versus Antidiscrimination, 75  
U. CHI. L. REV. 363, 364–65 (2008) (describing difficulties African Americans face in obtaining 
employment or services, concluding “[r]acial animus explains some of this behavior, but in the standard 
narrative, statistical discrimination is doing most of the work”).  
224. Agan & Starr, supra note 62. 
225. Id. at 229–30 (analyzing field study of 15,000 online job applications before and after 
enactment of Ban the Box laws). 
226. Dallan Flake subsequently conducted an online field study of employer response to 
applications with criminal records in jurisdictions with and without Ban the Box laws in place, finding 
an increase in “employment opportunities for ex-offenders without harming racial minorities.” Dallan 
F. Flake, Do Ban-the-Box Laws Really Work?, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1127 (2019). 
227. Joni Hersch and Jennifer Bennett Shinall argue that pre-hire inquiry prohibitions can 
trigger an ambiguity aversion, which may lead employers to choose applicants who disclose and explain 
a negative credential over applicants whose negative credentials are assumed but not explained. Joni 
Hersch & Jennifer Bennett Shinall, Something to Talk About: Information Exchange Under Employment 
Law, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 49, 87–88 (2016).  
228. See Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 210 (1991) (“The extra cost of 
employing members of one sex . . . does not provide an affirmative Title VII defense for a 
discriminatory refusal to hire members of that gender.”); BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS 
First to Printer_Elmore.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/4/20  1:26 PM 
2020] LABOR REDEMPTION IN WORK LAW 321 
Agan and Starr’s finding suggests that robust enforcement of antidiscrimination 
protections is in order. The possibility of privacy protections triggering statistical 
discrimination, however, has led numerous scholars to question the wisdom of 
antidiscrimination protections that impose costs on employers that may increase 
statistical discrimination.229 One might reasonably argue that whatever benefit Ban 
the Box laws confer to people with a criminal conviction is outweighed by their 
intensification of entrenched discrimination against African Americans.230  
These structural limitations and objections to Title VII and Ban the Box laws 
should not be overstated. Title VII remains a vital protection against overbroad 
background checks, and Ban the Box laws encourage employers to engage in a more 
deliberative process about whether a qualified applicant’s criminal record should be 
disqualifying. But this analysis suggests that these protections are stunted by deep 
structural—and often state-imposed—barriers that people with criminal  
records face. 
3. Labor Redemption as a Conceptual Tool to Resolve Structural Limitations to Title VII 
and Ban the Box Laws 
Labor redemption, as expressed in recent criminal justice reforms, can resolve 
these structural limitations by limiting the availability of irrelevant criminal records 
to employers and making available state-issued evidence of rehabilitation. Clean 
slate reforms reduce the impact of an overbroad criminal background check by 
removing old and minor criminal records from consideration without directly 
regulating the employer’s inquiries. For individuals whose criminal records suggest 
a plausible risk, certificates of relief provide candidates with evidence of redemption 
to persuade employers that the record should be ignored. Certificates of relief 
further the goal of a deliberative process in Ban the Box laws, by counteracting the 
stigma of a criminal record with a state marker of rehabilitation. They can also be 
powerful evidence in Title VII claims that an employer’s criminal background check 
that would exclude those candidates are not justified by business necessity. Courts 
appear more willing to scrutinize an employer’s rejection of an applicant if the 
applicant has a certificate from the state signaling her redemption.231  
 
MOVEMENT, supra note 178, at 60; Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA 
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 621 (2004).  
229. Strahilevitz, supra note 223, at 364 (arguing that employers react to restrictions on inquiries 
about criminal record histories by relying on “racial and gender proxies” to weed out applicants with 
criminal record histories). Professors Hersch and Shinall argue against flat inquiry prohibitions but in 
favor of permitting inquiries at the interview stage. Hersch & Shinall, supra note 227, at 67–68, 88 
(“Instead of remaining shrouded in taboo and concerns about potential illegality, personal history and 
family matters should be something to talk about during the interview, something to deepen both the 
employer’s and the applicant’s understanding of each other’s wants and needs.”). 
230. Strahilevitz, supra note 223, at 364. 
231. See, e.g., Brown v. City of New York, 869 F. Supp. 158, 175–76 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (denying 
summary judgment to employer on Title VII claim because of evidence of pretext, including because 
state certificate of relief from disabilities established presumption of rehabilitation); Meth v. Manhattan 
& Bronx Surface Transit Operating Auth., 134 A.D.2d 431, 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (finding that 
First to Printer_Elmore.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/4/20  1:26 PM 
322 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11:287 
State markers of redemption are also less likely to encourage statistical 
discrimination than Ban the Box laws alone because they would only retire records 
of or certify as redeemed those individuals who present no heightened risk to the 
workplace. They would not prohibit employer use of criminal records that show a 
bona fide risk. Concerns that employers will unfairly bear the costs of reintegration, 
finally, are addressed by tax credits, insurance, and bonding programs. 
This analysis suggests that encouraging the hiring of people with criminal 
records will require expanding second-chance reforms, which is a more plausible 
pathway to improving outcomes than directly extending the protections of Title 
VII. Its call to turn to the state removal of barriers is aligned with other critical 
assessments of civil rights law reform efforts. Disability law offers the closest 
analogy.232 Samuel Bagenstos, after uncovering structural limitations in the 
Americans with Disabilities Act that prevent it from significantly improving the 
workforce participation of people with disabilities, finds that “far and away the most 
significant barrier to employment for people with disabilities is the current structure 
of our health insurance system.”233 Social Security Disability Insurance and 
Medicaid contain work disincentives and other barriers that “operate to keep many 
people with disabilities out of the workforce well before any individual employer 
has an opportunity to discriminate against them.”234 Professor Bagenstos concludes 
that “the future of disability law lies as much in social welfare law as in 
antidiscrimination law.”235  
Gillian Lester offers a similar analysis of unpaid parental leave requirements in 
the Family and Medical Leave Act, which have not led substantial numbers of 
private-sector employers to offer paid leave for new parents.236 This is because there 
are structural limitations to employer-provided leave, including the possibility that 
employers will discriminate against women of childbearing age as a result and moral 
hazards that act as disincentives for private insurers to cover family leave. Professor 
Lester concludes that normative values of gender equality and increasing women’s 
labor market participation may be best achieved by state-subsidized family leave 
policies instead of shifting costs to employers and insurers.237  
 
denial of public employment to applicant with certificate of relief requires finding of nexus between 
conviction and qualifications for position and showing that hire “would pose an unreasonable risk to 
the general public”). 
232. In making this analogy, I do not claim an equivalence in the equality claims of people with 
criminal records and those of people with a disability. People with a disability are members of a 
protected class and as a result have greater claim to anti-discrimination law protections. 
233. Bagenstos, supra note 11, at 26. 
234. Id. at 34. 
235. Id. at 4. 
236. Lester, supra note 11. 
237. Id. at 12–15 (arguing that actuarial insurance is unsuited to parental leave because of 
“overwhelming problems of moral hazard”). 
First to Printer_Elmore.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/4/20  1:26 PM 
2020] LABOR REDEMPTION IN WORK LAW 323 
This is not to suggest that imposing costs on employers is never justified.238 
Labor redemption resolves limitations to existing law but does not substitute for 
employer regulation. Instead, I argue that labor redemption is necessary to address 
the role of the state in simultaneously imposing work as a condition of  
post-incarceration release, yet limiting and foreclosing opportunities to work 
through arbitrary, state-imposed barriers. Attending to the role of the state is also a 
more promising route for future law reform than extensions to existing employment 
laws that impose additional legal obligations on private employers. 
C. Dignity Interest to Balance Against Security Interests in Negligent Hiring Claims 
Employer fear of negligent hiring claims has historically been “[o]ne of the 
most significant impediments for employers in the hiring” of people with criminal 
records.239 To counteract this trend, law reform has sought to establish a rebuttable 
presumption against negligent hiring liability for employers who comply with Title 
VII in conducting a criminal background check. But employer fear of negligent 
hiring liability is misplaced. Courts reject a duty to inspect criminal record history in 
most instances. Negligent hiring case law is animated by an unmistakable deference 
to the employer’s managerial prerogatives. Further limiting negligent hiring claims 
can, moreover, burden the interest of vulnerable consumers in safety and security. 
This Section argues that markers of rehabilitation issued by the state can more 
effectively balance labor redemption and security interests in negligent hiring claims. 
Employers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in the hiring, training, 
supervision, and retention of employees,240 which includes a duty to investigate 
known risks.241 But courts generally reject a duty to inquire about criminal 
records.242 Even in instances where an employer is aware of a criminal record, courts 
limit the employer’s duty, requiring a tight nexus between the conviction and the 
harm.243 Typically, this requires evidence of observed employee behavior suggesting 
 
238. As Noah Zatz argues in critiquing the debate about whether the minimum wage and earned 
income tax credit is a more targeted anti-poverty device for ignoring other values expressed in minimum 
wage requirements, the equality goal of antidiscrimination law justifies shifting costs to third parties. 
Zatz, supra note 177, at 23–27, 37–40 (arguing in favor of reconceiving the minimum wage as a civil 
right to improve the earning capacity of people at the bottom of the income scale, rather than as an 
antipoverty device). 
239. THOMPSON, supra note 14, at 113. 
240. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (AM. L. INST. 1965). 
241. See, e.g., Anicich v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 852 F.3d 643, 654 (7th Cir. 2017), as 
amended (Apr. 13, 2017) (reversing a trial court’s dismissal of a negligent hiring claim because of evidence 
of the supervisor’s previous harassment of female subordinates, which created a question for the jury 
about whether his later murder of a female co-worker was foreseeable). 
242. See, e.g., Butler v. Harlbut, 826 S.W.2d 90, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992) (acknowledging “some 
situations” may require employers to inquire about a past criminal conviction that “would necessitate a 
rejection of the applicant,” but finding that “[r]equiring a duty upon an employer to search every job 
applicant’s past criminal record, if one exists, who interacts with the public is not reasonable”).  
243. See, e.g., Clark v. Aris, Inc., 890 N.E.2d 760, 765 n.1 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (finding that 
employer with knowledge of employee’s previous burglary conviction did not have a duty of care to 
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the risk of future violence244 or a showing that the work “involves a serious risk of 
harm.”245 As the Kansas Supreme Court explained in Schmidt v. HTG, Inc.,246 
deference to employer managerial prerogatives is justified by the difficulty in 
evaluating the risk signaled by a criminal record. In HTG, the court rejected a 
negligent hiring claim based on a previous criminal conviction of an otherwise 
competent employee because the employee displayed no ongoing negative 
behavior.247 The court rejected as overly onerous an employer duty to “ascertain the 
detailed history of every employee, whether criminal or not, and terminate the 
employment of an individual who is performing acceptable services and is clearly 
not unfit or incompetent, but who does pose some degree of risk due to  
previous actions.”248 
While courts in rejecting these claims do not expressly consider labor 
redemption, a low duty for employers in negligent hiring claims effectively avoids 
imposing a legal obligation on employers that would make people with a criminal 
record unemployable.249 But the heightened knowledge requirement imposed by 
courts in negligent hiring claims can burden the security interests of vulnerable 
consumers. As Catherine Sharkey observes, courts overwhelmingly dismiss 
negligent hiring claims, even against employers that “provide services to vulnerable 
populations . . . such as rehabilitation centers, schools, and churches—on the 
grounds that the employer lacked knowledge of the risk posed by the employee.”250 
Some clean slate reforms aiming to encourage the hiring of people with 
criminal records, moreover, can be in conflict with the safety interests protected by 
tort law. Louisiana and Texas impose an irrebuttable presumption that employers 
cannot be found negligent in hiring and supervising individuals solely because of an 
employee’s prior criminal record in most instances.251 Florida, Massachusetts, and 
 
family murdered in their home by employee, because, inter alia, conviction for robbery did not provide 
knowledge of risk of violence). 
244. Compare Pagayon v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 536 S.W.3d 499, 506 (Tex. 2017) (finding that 
two previous complaints of minor harassment about co-worker were insufficient to provide the 
employer with knowledge that co-worker presented a risk of violence), with Doe YZ  
v. Shattuck-St. Mary’s Sch., 214 F. Supp. 3d 763, 786–88 (D. Minn. 2016) (finding that specific reports 
of sexual contact between students and teacher “are objectively reasonable indicators of a potentially 
inappropriate relationship with students”). 
245. Cramer v. Hous. Opportunities Comm’n, 501 A.2d 35, 40 (Md. Ct. App. 1985) (“[W]here 
the work involves a serious risk of harm if the employee is unfit . . . there is no presumption of 
competence and there may well exist a duty to conduct a criminal record investigation.”). 
246. 961 P.2d 677 (Kan. 1998). 
247. Id. 
248. Id. at 695. 
249. This also theoretically avoids imposing conflicting obligations on employers hiring 
individuals with criminal records under Title VII and tort law, although, as discussed in the previous 
section, Title VII does not require the hiring of individuals with known, significant safety risks. See supra 
Section III.B.1. 
250. Catherine M. Sharkey, Institutional Liability for Employees’ Intentional Torts: Vicarious 
Liability as a Quasi-Substitute for Punitive Damages, 53 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 18 (2018). 
251. LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:291.1 (2019); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 142.002  
(West 2019). 
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New York establish a rebuttable presumption that employers are not liable for 
negligent hiring if they comply with state law in conducting a criminal background 
check.252 Minnesota limits the use of criminal background checks in negligent hiring 
trials unless the hiring increased the risk to the public.253 While these measures can 
advance the redemption of people with criminal records through work, there is a 
further need in these measures to preserve claims by vulnerable customers harmed 
by good faith, but unreasonable, employer assessments of risk. 
This Article argues that labor redemption addresses this structural limitation 
to negligent hiring claims by balancing the security interests of customers against 
the state’s interest in rehabilitation. Courts already balance dignity and security 
interests in failure to warn claims against the state for reintegrating incarcerated 
individuals into society. While generally, state officers are immune from tort liability 
for discretionary acts,254 some courts have found that parole officers take charge of 
parolees sufficiently to have a duty to exercise reasonable care.255 The California 
Supreme Court rejected this principle in Thompson v. County of Alameda,256 
concluding that there is no duty to warn about the release of an inmate with a violent 
history who makes nonspecific threats.257 The Court reasoned that the precaution 
of a warning about nonspecific threats would have little beneficial value and may 
“negate the rehabilitative purposes of the parole and probation system by 
stigmatizing the released offender in the public’s eye.”258  
The rejection in Thompson of claims that conflict with the state duty to 
rehabilitate an individual after release, while permitting claims that establish a 
specific risk, is also reflected in state determinations to seal and expunge records 
 
252. New York State adopted the first version, providing for a “rebuttable presumption” that 
an employer who makes a reasonable and good faith determination to hire a person with a criminal 
record in compliance with state corrections law does not violate state anti-discrimination laws.  
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296.15 (McKinney 2019); see also FLA. STAT. § 768.096 (2019); MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ch. 6, § 172(e) (2019). 
253. MINN. STAT. § 181.981(1) (2019). Dallan Flake offers a similar proposal that Title VII 
incorporate “a rebuttable presumption that an offending employee’s criminal history should be 
excluded from evidence in a negligent hiring case if the employer hired the individual after engaging in” 
a deliberative hiring process. See Flake, supra note 6, at 95. 
254. Section 319 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that an individual who takes 
charge of another person “whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others 
if not controlled” has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the person “from doing such harm.” 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (AM. LAW INST. 1965); see, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 820.2 
(West 2020) (“Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public employee is not liable for an injury 
resulting from his act or omission where the act or omission was the result of the exercise of the 
discretion vested in him, whether or not such discretion be abused.”). 
255. Taggart v. State, 822 P.2d 243, 255 (Wash. 1992) (“When a parolee’s criminal history and 
progress during parole show that the parolee is likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled, 
the parole officer is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the parolee and to prevent him 
or her from doing such harm.”). 
256. 614 P.2d 728 (Cal. 1980). 
257. In Thompson, a local government released a young person committed to a juvenile facility 
after he had allegedly expressed an intention to kill someone, and later murdered a child. Id. at 730. 
258. Id. at 736. 
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and issue certificates of relief. These markers of redemption can encourage courts 
to balance the labor redemption and security interests in negligent hiring claims. 
This is shown in negligent hiring claims in which courts consider evidence that the 
state found the individual to be rehabilitated. In O’Connor v. Corbett Lumber Corp.,259 
a North Carolina appeals court found that employers have no duty to protect 
customers from the criminal acts of work release inmates. As the court explained, 
no independent employer duty to inquire was necessary where the state “approved 
and recommended [the employee] for work release,” the employee “was 
psychologically tested and cleared as posing no danger to society,” and the state 
instructed employers “to treat work release inmates the same as they treat  
non-inmate employees with respect to the duties given to them.”260  
Thompson and O’Connor suggest that state-issued markers of rehabilitation can 
effectively balance the dignity and safety interests in negligent tort claims. Six states 
establish a presumption that employers who knowingly hire people with state-issued 
markers of redemption satisfy their duty of care.261 New York case law 
demonstrates how state-issued certificates of relief can encourage courts in these 
states to meaningfully balance redemption and security interests.262 New York 
provides certificates of relief, which create a rebuttable presumption of 
rehabilitation, and require that employers demonstrate a direct relationship between 
the conviction and the position sought to justify a denial.263 But the case law in these 
instances do not always favor the applicant, particularly those seeking positions that 
require direct contact with vulnerable people, such as children in schools. In Boone 
v. New York City Department of Education,264 for example, a trial court rejected a 
school’s determination that a petit larceny conviction suggested a direct risk of 
stealing confidential information from students as a school bus attendant. In Boone, 
the applicant had a certificate of relief and the conviction did not involve theft of 
confidential information.265 But the New York Court of Appeals, in contrast, 
upheld the same agency’s determination not to hire an individual as a school bus 
driver in In re Dempsey v. New York City Department of Education.266 In that case, the 
applicant had five convictions, two of which were drug-related felonies, for which 
the applicant received certificates of relief from the state.267 The court, nonetheless, 
 
259. 352 S.E.2d 267 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987). 
260. Id. at 273. 
261. Those states are Georgia, Illinois, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, and Wisconsin.  
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-54 (2019); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5 / 5-5.5-25 (2020); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. § 15A-173.5 (West 2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.25(g)(2) (West 2020); TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-29-107(n)(1) (2019); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.492 (West 2020). 
262. See, e.g., Boone v N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 38 N.Y.S.3d 711 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016). 
263. Id. 
264. Id. 
265. Id. at 721. 
266. 33 N.E.3d 485 (N.Y. 2015). 
267. Id. at 491–92. 
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held that the agency appropriately rejected the candidate because the convictions 
directly related to the risk of distributing controlled substances to students.268 
This analysis suggests that courts can more meaningfully balance the 
redemption and security interests in a negligent hiring claim in states that provide 
access to markers of rehabilitation. State-provided bonding and insurance programs 
can additionally shift the costs of hiring individuals with markers of risk to the state 
by compensating injured plaintiffs. Labor redemption may also be used defensively 
by the state, relying on the reasoning in Thompson, to avoid liability for unforeseeable 
harm caused by expansion of reentry programs.  
The aim of this Part is not to describe all possible applications of labor 
redemption but to show its broad doctrinal significance. Practitioners, 
administrative agencies, courts, and states may elaborate on labor redemption as a 
right and interest. Practitioners may challenge state re-incarceration for failure to 
find work, and arbitrary denials of occupational licenses and public employment, as 
deprivations of due process, and assert the significance of certificates of relief in 
Title VII and negligent hiring suits. Courts and the EEOC can broadly consider 
comparator and statistical evidence and reject employer business necessity defenses 
that do not account for state-issued markers of redemption. Courts considering 
negligent hiring claims can infer that an applicant with a certificate of relief is 
rehabilitated. Generally, states recognizing labor redemption in reentry policies can 
require that post-release work requirements have a rehabilitative purpose269 and that 
occupational license restrictions consider the applicant’s rehabilitation.270 
Labor redemption can also guide future law reform, as I argue in the  
next Part. 
IV. LABOR REDEMPTION AS GUIDE FOR LAW REFORM 
Labor redemption as an interest and a right can guide future law reform. Labor 
redemption, specifically, justifies automatically expunging and sealing criminal 
records or granting certificates of relief, after the period in which the criminal 
records suggest no greater risk than the general population. It would, likewise, justify 
a process for recently released individuals to obtain markers of redemption to signal 
desistance to employers. These reforms have normative implications for other areas, 
 
268. Id. 
269. New York requires that conditions of post-release supervision must have a rehabilitative 
purpose. See People v. Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 150 (N.Y. 1995) (“The punitive and deterrent 
nature” of requiring an individual convicted of driving while intoxicated to affix “CONVICTED DWI” 
to his license plate as a term of probation “overshadow[ed] any possible rehabilitative potential” of the 
probationary conditions.); People v. McNair, 665 N.E.2d 167, 171 (N.Y. 1996) (“The general rule to be 
drawn from Letterlough is that a court may not create its own probationary condition which is 
predominantly punitive in the sense that its punitive elements overshadow its rehabilitative 
components.”). 
270. New York State requires its occupational licenses and public and private employers to 
consider the applicant’s rehabilitation, among other factors. N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 753(g)  
(McKinney 2019). 
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especially housing discrimination, in which private decision makers exclude 
candidates because of state-imposed stigmas. 
A. Automating Sealing, Expungement, and Certifications of Relief 
Despite state expansion of sealing, expungement, and certificates of relief, 
expanding their reach will require further legislative change. There is no 
constitutional right to sealing and expungement. States have been found to violate 
the due process rights of arrestees for public shaming,271 but the same protections 
do not apply to individuals who have been convicted of a crime. Constitutional 
challenges to the public availability of criminal records are further limited by the 
state action requirement.272 Criminal records are not typically published to 
employers by the state, but rather by credit reporting agencies (CRAs), which are 
private actors. While the state does make criminal records publicly available to 
CRAs, state action exceptions are narrowly construed by the Supreme Court,273 and 
CRAs are unlikely to be considered agents of the state.274 
Yet, as explained in Section II.A, people with criminal records have a 
significant dignity interest in mechanisms to remove criminal records from use by 
employers. This interest should prevail for criminal records that do not suggest a 
significantly heightened risk for employers. Expungement and certificates of relief, 
moreover, are attractive subjects of legislative reform, particularly if automated,275 
because they are effective, do not increase workplace risk, and are virtually costless. 
Recent empirical evidence strongly supports the claim that disrupting unnecessary 
stigmas has a positive effect on employment. J.J. Prescott and Sonja Starr examined 
expungement practices in Michigan, finding that recipients were thirteen percent 
 
271. See Demery v. Arpaio, 378 F.3d 1020, 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that sheriff’s use 
of webcam to post video of pre-trial arrestees “being photographed, fingerprinted, and booked” on the 
internet without legitimate public interest violated due process); see also Bursac v. Suozzi, 868 N.Y.S.2d 
470, 481 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (holding that the state’s “actions, in publishing and maintaining the petitioner’s 
name, picture and identifying information embedded in a press release on the County’s Internet Web 
site, which results in limitless and eternal notoriety, without any controls,” supplies the additional harm 
that satisfies the stigma-plus standard). 
272. Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 936 (1982). 
273. A CRA’s conduct satisfies this requirement only if it fulfills a public function, or if the 
state’s involvement with the CRA is so entangled that the private actor’s conduct is no longer private. 
See Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 840 (1982); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365  
U.S. 715, 716, 721–22 (1961). 
274. Government contractors and public utilities generally do not meet this standard.  
Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 840–41; Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 52 (1999). 
275. While many states permit individuals to petition for expungement, they can be 
administratively complex and burdensome for petitioners. Few eligible individuals are aware of  
petition-based expungement, and those who are rarely use it. See Colleen V. Chien, The Second Chance 
Gap, 119 MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 12), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3265335 [https://perma.cc/8J62-PUR2] (finding in empirical analysis that 
only about three percent of eligible individuals obtain expungement in petition-based jurisdictions). 
Few individuals, similarly, receive petition-based certificates of rehabilitation. New York State, the first 
state to offer these markers of redemption, “grants only about 3,000 of them per year.” Elmore, supra 
note 158, at 1013. 
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more likely to be hired and that their wages increased around twenty-five percent.276 
These findings are consistent with those of Peter Leasure and Tia Stevens 
Andersen, who assessed the effectiveness of certificates of relief issued in Ohio. 
Professors Leasure and Andersen found that a certificate of relief effectively erased 
the stigma of the criminal record.277 While fewer than ten percent of applicants who 
reported a conviction without a certificate of relief received a callback, over  
twenty-five percent of those who reported a conviction with a certificate of relief 
did, nearly as high as those who reported no conviction at all.278 
Nor would sealing, expungement, and issuing certificates of rehabilitation 
necessarily increase workplace risk. Professors Prescott and Starr found that 
individuals whose records were expunged in Michigan “pose a lower crime risk than 
the general population of Michigan as a whole.”279 The likelihood of a person 
convicted of a violent crime committing a future violent crime is very low, 
particularly older individuals who have been incarcerated for a period of time.280 
This suggests that widespread adoption of labor redemption reforms by automating 
markers of redemption would significantly improve the employment outcomes of 
people with a criminal record without increasing workplace risk.281  
To be sure, the effectiveness of automating sealing, expungement, and 
certifications of relief will depend on how employers respond. Employers may react 
to automated sealing and expungement of criminal records and certifications of 
relief by engaging in statistical discrimination against African Americans or by 
searching for negative credentials on the Internet. These concerns merit further 
study. But as Prescott and Starr explain, automating markers of redemption seems 
likely to reduce these risks, especially compared with Ban the Box measures 
forbidding all criminal record inquiries. Current measures automating the sealing 
and expungement of criminal records and certificates of relief target only old or 
minor criminal records. To the extent that employers will continue to have access 
to criminal records that signal a bona fide risk, it is unclear why sealing and 
expunging old and minor records would increase statistical discrimination.282 And 
while it is possible that employers will obtain negative credentials on the Internet, 
this has not emerged as a significant problem in the states that have automatic 
sealing and expungement policies.283 This may be because most employers use 
 
276. Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2527–32, 2551.  
277. Leasure & Andersen, supra note 62. 
278. Id. at 19–20 n.44. 
279. Prescott & Starr, supra note 9259, at 2514. 
280. Id. at 2513–16. 
281. Id. at 2518 (concluding that automatic sealing and expungement provisions “with 
comparable requirements and waiting periods [as Michigan] are unlikely to deny [employers] access to 
information that they need to protect themselves or their employees,” or customers). 
282. Prescott & Starr, supra note 9259, at 2548-50.  
283. Id. at 2541-42. Some scholars have expressed concern that the private availability of 
criminal record histories makes reducing access through official channels futile. JACOBS, supra note 49, 
at 120–21. 
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CRAs to conduct background checks, which are required to retire sealed and 
expunged records from their databases by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.284 The 
availability of certificates of relief should also resolve any concern about the First 
Amendment implications of restricting access to criminal records,285 since 
certificates of relief can be used for any record that would otherwise require 
disclosure under freedom of information laws.286 
Sealing, expungement, certificates of relief, and removal of occupational 
license restrictions for criminal records that suggest no future risk are cost 
effective.287 The administrative costs and uncertainty of risk assessments can be 
minimized by reference to general statistics instead of engaging in individualized 
determinations. Criminologists Alfred Blumstein and Kiminori Nakamura propose 
a general risk assessment of individuals with criminal records, which they call 
“redemption studies,” by comparing their criminal record history with arrest 
frequencies in the general population.288 Professors Blumstein and Nakamura have 
found that individuals with one to two convictions stand no greater risk of an arrest 
than the general population after five years without an arrest, and thirteen years for 
individuals with six to ten convictions.289 Professors Prescott and Starr, after 
reviewing Blumstein and Nakamura’s and other extant redemption studies, 
conclude that they reflect a redemption period “usually in the range of four to ten 
years.”290 Redemption may occur earlier for some offenses and for  
older individuals.291 
As with Michigan and Pennsylvania, states can protect the societal interest in 
labor redemption without incurring significant administrative costs by removing 
 
284. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681c (2012); see Elmore, supra note 158, at 1013. 
285. See JACOBS, supra note 49, at 176–79 (concluding that the First Amendment right to public 
access to criminal records “remains unresolved”); Eldar Haber, Digital Expungement, 77  
MD. L. REV. 337, 372–74 (2018) (arguing that “as long as the United States treats criminal history 
records as public records, regulating the use of these records will be unconstitutional”).  
286. The First Amendment prohibits limiting disclosure of information already released to the 
public, and access to open court records. The state may, however, restrict access to validly sealed records 
and some underlying information retained by law enforcement agencies. The Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) permits law enforcement to withhold disclosure of information that would constitute an 
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C). While restricting access to 
irrelevant records burdens the First Amendment right to disclosure, FOIA exempts from disclosure 
government records about private citizens that can “reasonably be expected to invade that citizen’s 
privacy,” including contents of a rap sheet and mug shots. U.S. Dep’t of Just. v. Reporters Comm. for 
Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 777 n.22 (1989) (rap sheet); Times Picayune Publ’g Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t 
of Just., 37 F. Supp. 2d 472, 479 (E.D. La. 1999) (mug shot). 
287. Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2551–52 (finding that expungement “compares very 
favorably to job training in terms of both effectiveness and cost-effectiveness”). 
288. BLUMSTEIN & NAKAMURA, supra note 34. 
289. Id. at 22. 
290. Prescott & Starr, supra note 9, at 2519. 
291. A follow-up study by Prescott, Starr, and Pyle found that redemption occurs earlier for 
older individuals, and that people convicted of violent offenses, who are often left out of expungement 
policies, are the least likely to recidivate among people who are incarcerated. Prescott et al., supra note 
220, at 1688, 1696–97. 
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state-imposed work barriers within a similar timeline, or earlier upon completion of 
a reentry program that demonstrates rehabilitation. 
B. Ease Availability of Other Markers of Rehabilitation for the Recently Incarcerated 
While automating markers of redemption can improve labor market outcomes 
for people with old or minor records, sealing, expungement, and certificates of 
rehabilitation are often unavailable for people with recent, serious criminal 
convictions. The dignity interest in removal of collateral consequences for these 
individuals can be outweighed by the security interests of employers, employees, 
and consumers, since recent, serious criminal convictions can suggest future risk. 
Employer aversions can even be necessary in workplaces with vulnerable employees 
and consumers. Instead, the dignity interests of these individuals can be effectively 
addressed through reentry programming, such as drug treatment and work 
programs, that can demonstrate rehabilitation. Work programs, for example, can 
certify the candidate’s performance history and provide access to employer 
references. These markers of rehabilitation can overcome employer aversions to 
even significant criminal record histories.292 In contrast to sealing and expunging 
old or minor convictions, however, these markers can impose large costs on the 
state, requiring further justification.  
That justification lies in the state duty to provide markers of redemption that 
are necessary for recently released individuals to comply with work mandates and 
to pay penalties and fees in order to avoid re-incarceration. These individuals have 
a significant dignity interest in markers necessary to comply with these state 
mandates, which would demonstrate their rehabilitation to employers. In addition 
to addressing the perversity of state mandates that individuals cannot comply with, 
labor redemption for this group also advances important societal interests. 
Criminologists insist on the public value of reintegration of this group.293 
Recidivism rates are highest for people with multiple convictions and in the year 
after incarceration.294 Steady, meaningful work is most likely to have a desistance 
effect for this group. Shifting the costs of reintegration of recently incarcerated 
individuals onto private employers, moreover, is implausible. Employers often may 
(in some cases, must) lawfully discriminate against recently incarcerated individuals. 
The state assignment to find and keep work as a condition of supervised 
release to avoid re-incarceration implies an affirmative duty of reintegration on the 
state beyond removal of arbitrary barriers. Labor redemption for these individuals 
requires attending to drivers of chronic unemployment among people with criminal 
records, especially the lack of education and job skills, and high rates of substance 
abuse and mental illness. State requirements that the recently incarcerated find and 
 
292. See, e.g., Megan Denver, Criminal Records, Positive Credentials and Recidivism: Incorporating 
Evidence of Rehabilitation into Criminal Background Check Employment Decisions, 66 CRIME  
& DELINQ. 194, 211–12 (2020). 
293. See, e.g., BLUMSTEIN & NAKAMURA, supra note 34. 
294. Prisoners and Prisoner Re-Entry, supra note 28. 
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keep work imply a duty to provide a process by which recently incarcerated 
individuals can obtain markers to demonstrate their rehabilitation to employers.  
C. Expand Redemption Beyond Work Law: The Housing Analogy 
Labor redemption has implications beyond work law, to other areas, especially 
housing discrimination, in which private decision makers have an aversion to 
unnecessary, state-imposed stigmas. In these cases, the expanding use of criminal 
background checks is most effectively addressed by shifting attention to the state 
and its imposition of arbitrary barriers that private decision makers rely on to make 
overbroad, but legally defensible, exclusions. 
Housing is the closest parallel to the legal protections available to, and roles of 
the state and private actors in the employment of, people with criminal records. 
Like employment, housing is necessary for successful reintegration into society. 
Successful transition from prison to affordable housing improves welfare and 
reduces recidivism.295 But private landlords have a strong aversion to people with 
criminal records and often will not lease an apartment to individuals with a criminal 
record history. Many local governments restrict public housing based on criminal 
record history.296 Thousands of cities have additionally enacted “crime free” 
neighborhood ordinances that encourage landlords to conduct background checks 
and refuse leases to individuals with a criminal record history.297 Overbroad 
background checks by private landlords, encouraged by local government, deepen 
and racialize housing segregation with a “prison to homelessness” pipeline that 
disparately impacts African American and Latinx communities.298 
The Fair Housing Act (FHA), like Title VII, prohibits housing discrimination 
by private landlords. While people with criminal records are not a protected class 
under the FHA, it does permit challenges to overbroad landlord background checks 
based on a disparate impact theory.299 The United States Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (HUD) in 2016 issued guidance that overbroad 
background checks can have an unlawful “discriminatory effect” on race and 
national origin.300 But FHA disparate impact analysis suffers from the same 
structural limitations as Title VII. Prior to October 26, 2020, landlords could defeat 
 
295. Valerie Schneider, The Prison to Homelessness Pipeline: Criminal Record Checks, Race, and 
Disparate Impact, 93 IND. L.J. 421, 432–33 (2018). 
296. Id. at 450–51. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. at 434; Deborah N. Archer, The New Housing Segregation: The Jim Crow Effects of  
Crime-Free Housing Ordinances, 118 MICH. L. REV. 173, 193–95 (2019). On the impact of private 
landlord discrimination on residential racial segregation and plausible systemic legal challenges to it, see 
Anthony V. Alfieri, Black, Poor, and Gone: Civil Rights Law’s Inner-City Crisis, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 629, 666–67 (2019). 
299. The Supreme Court in 2015 upheld the availability of disparate impact challenges under 
the FHA in Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 
576 U.S. 519 (2015). 
300. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (2017). 
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a disparate impact challenge by showing that a background check is “necessary to 
achieve a substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interest.”301 This standard is 
“essentially equivalent”302 to the Title VII business justification defense, prohibiting 
broad exclusion of a prospective tenant based on arrest records or “bald assertions,” 
while permitting landlords to conduct facially reasonable background checks.303 
HUD replaced this standard with a new rule, effective October 26, 2020, loosening 
the business justification requirement to merely require the landlord to show that 
the background check “advances a valid interest (or interests) and is therefore not 
arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary.”304 
As Valerie Schneider and Deborah Archer separately propose, overbroad 
private landlord exclusions and municipal “crime free” ordinances raise plausible 
FHA disparate impact challenges.305 But, whether HUD’s new rule remains in place 
or HUD reverts to the previous rule, it is uncertain how these challenges will fare 
against the landlord business necessity defense. It seems likely that a court would 
express similar skepticism to background check challenges under the FHA as the 
Third Circuit expressed in El to that Title VII challenge. Courts following El would 
permit exclusion of candidates whose criminal record indicates a heightened risk, 
especially in dwellings that include vulnerable tenants and in which the candidate 
cannot demonstrate rehabilitation. As in employment, absent evidence of candidate 
rehabilitation, these checks appear likely to survive FHA challenge, and privacy 
protections such as Ban the Box would delay, but not deter, overbroad checks.306 
My assessment that state-issued markers of redemption can resolve structural 
limitations to Title VII applies to the close parallel of housing discrimination against 
people with criminal records. Second-chance reforms can reduce the effect of 
landlord aversions to criminal records by removing old and minor criminal records 
from consideration and expanding access to certificates of relief, transitional 
housing, and references from previous landlords. These markers of rehabilitation 
can cast doubt on the landlord’s business justification defense in FHA disparate 
impact challenges. Tax incentives, bonding, and insurance can further reduce the 
private landlord aversion by shifting the costs of reintegration to the state.  
 
301. Id. § 100.500(c)(2). 
302. Schneider, supra note 295, at 443. 
303. A landlord may defeat a prima facie FHA disparate impact claim by showing a business 
necessity for the rule. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2); OFF. OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP’T OF  
HOUS. & URB. DEV., GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF FAIR HOUSING ACT STANDARDS TO THE USE 
OF CRIMINAL RECORDS BY PROVIDERS OF HOUSING AND REAL ESTATE-RELATED TRANSACTIONS 
4–5 (2016), https://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddoc?id=hud_ogcguidappfhastandcr. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/UP28-D5CU]. 
304. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (2020). 
305. Archer, supra note 298, at 223–31; Schneider, supra note 295, at 451–52. 
306. This analysis is aligned with Professor Schneider’s call for judicial attention to mitigating 
evidence of rehabilitation by tenants and for expansion of Ban the Box laws to landlords. Schneider, 
supra note 295, at 451–52. As indicated in El, the difficulty lies in the lack of available evidence of 
rehabilitation that courts may rely on in making this determination. 
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In conclusion, labor redemption offers a conceptual framework to guide 
second-chance reforms to strengthen the employment protections of people with 
criminal records. Reentry reforms, in particular, should focus on expanding the 
removal of state-imposed barriers to work and increasing access to rehabilitation 
programming that offers markers of redemption for people with recent criminal 
convictions. Expansion of these reforms will strengthen existing employment law 
protections, without imposing legal obligations on private employers and the need 
to amend employment laws. Reconceiving employment rights as a state obligation 
to remove unnecessary barriers has implications beyond employment, especially in 
housing discrimination law, in which private decision makers exclude candidates 
because of an aversion to arbitrary state-imposed barriers.  
CONCLUSION: LABOR REDEMPTION AS A PARTIAL SOLUTION TO BARRIERS TO 
WORK CREATED BY MASS INCARCERATION 
This Article argues that improving reentry outcomes in employment will 
require disrupting the stigma of a criminal record and other unnecessary  
state-imposed barriers to work. Second-chance reforms of sealing, expungement, 
certificates of relief, and financial incentives to hire strengthen and shape existing 
employment protections for people with criminal records, without the need to 
amend existing employment law. This new body of work law responds to the era of 
mass incarceration by recognizing the dignity interest and rights of workers who 
labor in the shadow of the carceral state. 
While labor redemption is an important, emerging area with implications 
beyond work law, a caveat is in order: it is an incomplete vision of reentry policy. 
Redemption premised on the opportunity to seek work in the formal economy has 
little value to individuals working in secondary labor markets because of race, sex, 
class, and other stigmas. It has no value at all to the many individuals in the carceral 
state who cannot work because of a disability.307  
Successful reintegration into society requires state attention to a complicated 
web of social problems inadequately addressed after the demise of welfare as a 
meaningful safety net and magnified by tough-on-crime criminal justice policies. 
The criminal justice system has not yet come to grips with, and has indeed 
contributed to, the high rates of substance abuse and mental illness, lack of 
education and job skills, and chronic unemployment in poor communities. State 
and local governments continue to allocate scarce resources to policing and 
incarceration while starving social programs better equipped to attend to these 
drivers of violence and social disorder.308 These problems place insurmountable 
 
307. One-quarter of Professor Western’s sample of individuals released from state prison were 
jobless during the entire year after leaving prison. WESTERN, supra note 36, at 97–98. Professor Western 
reports that many of these individuals live with chronic pain, serious mental illness and a drug addition, 
so “cannot work and face the deepest poverty as a result.” Id. at 98. 
308. Amna Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 405, 451–52 (2018) 
(“Policing and imprisonment become ‘catch all’ responses to social problems like homelessness, mental 
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burdens on people leaving incarceration and continue the cycle of incarceration for 
many. Attending to these problems will require a broader national commitment to 
reintegration and to reinvesting in communities where people with criminal records 
come from, and where they return to.309 
The role of labor redemption in promoting reintegration through work 
described here should be understood as fitting within this larger project. The racism 
and structural violence of the criminal justice system require disrupting the stigma 
of a criminal record for employers. A discouraging number of people after 
incarceration remain jobless, particularly members of racial minorities. Current 
equality and privacy protections undermine reentry policy because they do not 
attend to the role of the state in the problem; instead, they impose costs on 
employers that they are resistant to accept and that courts are reluctant to impose. 
This Article turns attention to the state and proposes labor redemption as a dignity 
interest that flows from the state assignment of the responsibility to the individual 
to reintegrate into society through work. Labor redemption entitles these individuals 
to protection from unnecessary interference with that responsibility. This Article 
proposes labor redemption as a conceptual framework to dismantle unnecessary 




health crises, drug use, and unemployment, from which the state has otherwise disinvested.”); 
WESTERN, supra note 36, at 188 (“Under the harsh conditions of American poverty, the antidote to 
violence is not more punishment but restoring the institutions, social bonds, and well-being that enable 
order and predictability in daily life.”). 
309. See WESTERN, supra note 36, at 182–84 (assessing that the “thick public safety” of “families, 
work, and other social supports” gives people released from prison not only physical security, but 
security “in their housing, intimate relationships, and livelihoods,” but that these social supports depend 
on public supports, including transitional support for individuals the year after release, continuity of 
medical and mental health care, and secure housing). 
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